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Abstract
Side Channel Attacks on Symmetric Key Primitives
Yaser Esmaeili Salehani
Cryptographic primitives, including symmetric key encryption algorithms, are the basic
building blocks of security systems. Cryptanalytic attacks against these algorithms can be
divided into two classes: pure mathematical attacks and side channel attacks. Pure mathe-
matical attacks are traditional cryptanalytic techniques that rely only on known or chosen
input-output pairs of the encryption function, and exploit the inner structure of the cipher
to reveal secret key information. In side channel attacks, the physical implementation of
the cryptographic algorithms is considered. In particular, in this class of attacks, it is as-
sumed that the attacker has some access to the cryptographic device and is able to make
measurements with respect to time or power consumption, or is able to induce errors in the
memory or operation of the device. The additional information gained by utilizing such a
side channel are then combined with methods that exploit the inner structure of the cipher to
reveal the secret key. The wide spread of unprotected software or hardware cryptographic
implementations can offer various possibilities for these side channel attacks. Throughout
this thesis, we present side channel cryptanalysis against three symmetric key ciphers.
First, we present a differential fault analysis of SOSEMANUK which is a software-based
stream cipher that supports a variable key length between 128 and 256 bits and a 128-bit
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initial value. SOSEMANUK has passed all three stages of the ECRYPT stream cipher project
and is a member of the eSTREAM software portfolio. We analyze the cipher utilizing
the fault model in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random inner state
word but cannot control the exact injected fault locations. Our attack, which recovers the
secret inner state of the cipher, requires around 6144 faults, work equivalent to around 248
SOSEMANUK iterations and a storage of around 238.17 bytes.
Next, we present a differential fault analysis against Hummingbird. Hummingbird is
a lightweight encryption algorithm that has a hybrid structure of block cipher and stream
cipher with 16-bit block size, 256-bit key size, and 80-bit internal state. We analyze the
cipher utilizing the fault model in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random
word before the linear transform, after the s-boxes, of the four block ciphers which are used
in the Hummingbird encryption process but cannot control the exact location of injected
faults. Our attack, which recovers the 256-bit key, requires around 50 faults and 266 steps.
ZUC is a new stream cipher that was proposed for the 4G mobile standard by the Data
Assurance and Communication Security Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences. Our third contribution is a scan based cryptanalysis of ZUC. A scan path connects
registers in a hardware circuit serially so that a tester can observe the register values inside
the circuit. Scan-based attacks exploit the scan chains that are inserted into the devices for
the purpose of testing. Under reasonable assumptions, our scan-based cryptanalysis allows
the attacker to ascertain the whole location of internal registers including the LFSR and
the memory cells of the cipher. The attack, which utilizes the key loading procedure and
the working mode of the cipher execution procedure, allows the cryptanalyst to recover the
iv
secret internal state of the cipher in a relatively small number of clock cycles.
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Protection and hiding of valuable information has a very old history [1] where cryptology
has developed over the centuries from an art, in which only few were ingenious, into a
science with well established foundations. There are several goals which security profes-
sionals desire to achieve through the use of cryptography. These goals include confidential-
ity, data integrity, entity authentication, non-repudiation and data origin authentication [2].
Cryptology encompasses two related fields: cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptogra-
phy can be defined as the study of mathematical techniques to ensure various aspects of
information security as those mentioned. On the other hand, cryptanalysis can be defined
as the study of techniques to analyze, and break, information security services by targeting,
specifically, the underlying cryptographic algorithms.
Cryptographic primitives, which can be seen as the basic building blocks of any cryp-
tosystem, are extremely important in the view of cryptographers and attackers. While cryp-
tographers design cryptosystems using these low-level building blocks, attackers attempt
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to evaluate such blocks in order to compromise the overall security of deployed systems.
Block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions, message authentication codes and public key
cryptosystems are among the most fundamental primitives of cryptography.
Cryptographic algorithms can be divided into two basic classes: symmetric key (or
secret key) systems and asymmetric key (or public key) systems. Both of these systems
are used to provide a variety of security functions for networks and information systems.
Whereas symmetric key cryptography uses the same key for encrypting and decrypting
information, public key algorithms do not require a secure initial exchange of one or more
secret keys between the sender and receiver. In symmetric key cryptography, confidentiality
is provided by using stream ciphers or block ciphers. While stream ciphers encrypt the bits
of the message one at a time, block ciphers take a number of bits and encrypt them as block
units under a private key. The focus of this work is the cryptanalysis of symmetric key
primitives.
1.1 Motivation
Generally, cryptanalysis of a cipher, or simply cipher breaking, does not mean finding
an efficient algorithm for an adversary to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext. In
particular, in the academic cryptanalysis literature, breaking a cipher mainly means finding
a weakness in the cipher that can be exploited with a complexity strictly less than brute
force. In other words, the cryptosystem is said to be broken if the effort required by the
attacker to gain the secret information (e.g., plaintext or key) is less than the effort needed
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by naive exhaustive key search. Based on this definition, which can be controversial, one
may need unrealistic amounts of time, memory, or known/chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
In fact, most of the published pure mathematical attacks against modern ciphers belong to
this category, i.e., these attacks require an unrealistic amount of resources.
However, in many practical scenarios, the adversary may have access to the crypto-
graphic device. In such a case, side channel attacks allow the attackers to practically
break these cryptosystems using relatively small amount of computational resources and
a small number of known/chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In particular, side channel at-
tacks make use of the physical implementation of the cryptosystem and cover different
models which increase the capabilities of the attackers. These capabilities include gain-
ing side channel information about the encryption or decryption process such as timing
analysis [3] and power analysis [4]. It may also include the ability to apply some kind of
influence on the internal state of the cryptographic devices by using unsupported supply
voltage or excessively overclocking the device. Strong electric or magnetic fields, or even
ionizing radiation flipping random bit(s) in the internal registers of the hardware implemen-
tation may also be used to gain access to some faulty computations of the cryptographic
devices which allow the recovery of secret internal information [5].
Currently, the wide spread of unprotected software or hardware cryptographic imple-
mentations offer various possibilities for these side channel attacks. Such attacks are practi-
cal and do not require expensive equipments. One class of side channel attacks that we will
focus on throughout this work is differential fault analysis (DFA) [6]. DFA is a powerful
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side channel attack which can be applied to various kinds of cryptographic devices includ-
ing public key systems, block ciphers and stream ciphers. The basic idea behind DFA is to
force the cryptographic device to produce some controlled incorrect output results which
allow the attacker to deduce information about the secret internal state of the cryptographic
device. This technique was first applied to RSA [6] and then generalized to other public
key ciphers [6] and block ciphers such as DES [7] and AES [8]. Later on, DFA was also
applied to stream ciphers [9], particularly against the finalist list of the eStream project
including HC-128 [10] and Rabbit [11, 12].
In the first part of this work, we present a differential fault analysis on SOSEMANUK,
which is a software-based stream cipher that has passed all three stages of the ECRYPT
stream cipher project and is a member of the eSTREAM software portfolio.
Recently, dedicated ultra-lightweight symmetric key algorithms have been proposed for
applications within low-cost resource constrained devices such as RFID tags, smart cards,
and wireless sensor nodes. Obviously, security and privacy challenges should be considered
in these devices as well. In particular, DFA technique is still one of the main cryptanalysis
techniques that can be utilized to break theses cryptographic devices. Consequently, in
the second part of this work, we apply DFA to cryptanalyze a relatively new lightweight
encryption algorithm, Hummingbird, proposed by Engels et al. at FC’10 [13].
Design for testability (DFT) is a technique which has drastically improved the manu-
facturing testing with an efficient method of yielding a high fault coverage. Although the
scan test causes DFT to be more successful, it can also be applied to assist attackers launch
non-invasive attacks, which exploit information that is unintentionally leaked externally,
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to recover important secret information from the cryptographic device. In general, this
method can be applied to various kinds of cryptographic algorithms that are implemented
in hardware. In the last part of this thesis, we present a scan-based cryptanalysis against a
hardware implementation of the new stream cipher ZUC which was recently proposed for
inclusion in the 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) mobile standard [14, 15].
1.2 Contributions of the thesis
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
∙ Differential Fault Analysis of SOSEMANUK: SOSEMANUK [16] is a software-
based stream cipher which supports a variable key length between 128 and 256 bits
and a 128-bit initial value. It has passed all three stages of the ECRYPT stream cipher
project and is a member of the eSTREAM software portfolio. Our first contribution
is a fault analysis attack on SOSEMANUK. The fault model in which we analyze
the cipher is the one in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random
inner state word but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. Our attack,
which recovers the secret inner state of the cipher, requires around 6144 faults, work
equivalent to around 248 SOSEMANUK iterations and a storage of around 238.17 bytes.
∙ Differential Fault Analysis of Hummingbird: Hummingbird [13,17] is a lightweight
encryption algorithm proposed by Engels et al. at FC’10. Unlike other lightweight
cryptographic primitives, which can be classified as either block ciphers or stream
ciphers, Hummingbird has a hybrid structure of block cipher and stream cipher with
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16-bit block size, 256-bit key size, and 80-bit internal state. Preliminary analysis
conducted by the cipher’s designers shows that it is resistant to most common attacks
against block ciphers and stream ciphers. Our second contribution is a differential
fault analysis attack on Hummingbird. The fault model in which we analyze the
cipher, is the one where the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random word
before the linear transform, after the s-boxes, of the four block ciphers which are
used in the Hummingbird encryption process but cannot control the exact location of
injected faults. Our attack, which recovers the 256-bit key, requires around 50 faults
and 266 steps.
∙ Scan Based Side Channel Attack of ZUC: ZUC [14, 15] is a relatively new stream
cipher that was proposed for the 4G mobile standard by the Data Assurance and
Communication Security Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Our
third contribution is a scan based cryptanalysis against ZUC. Under reasonable as-
sumptions, our cryptanalysis allows the attacker to ascertain the whole location of
internal registers of the LFSR and the memory cells.
The above results are partially published in [18] and [19].
1.3 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter introduces the required
background and the literature review of the side channel attacks. Our differential fault
analysis of SOSEMANUK is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 includes our differential fault
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analysis of Hummingbird. The scan based cryptanalysis of ZUC is presented in chapter 5.
Finally, chapter 6 provides the conclusions and future work.
7
Chapter 2
Cryptanalysis of Symmetric Key
Encryption Algorithms
Symmetric key encryption algorithms can be classified as either block ciphers or stream
ciphers. In this chapter, we first provide a brief introduction to block ciphers and stream ci-
phers. We then present an overview of different cryptanalytic attacks against these ciphers.
2.1 Block ciphers
Symmetric key block ciphers are among the most prominent elements in modern cryptog-
raphy. As a fundamental building block, their versatility allows the construction of pseudo
random number generators, stream ciphers, MACs, and hash functions [2]. Individually,
they provide confidentiality under a secret parameter called private key or secret key.
Block ciphers operate on fixed length groups of bits, called blocks, typically of sizes
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ranging between 64 to 256 bits. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) [20], which was
developed in the 1970s by IBM, is an example for a symmetric key block cipher which
encrypts 64-bit data blocks under the control of a 56-bit key. The DES decryption is the
inverse of DES encryption and uses the same key. In 2001, the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [21], with a 128-bit block length and 128-256 bit key length, was approved
by NIST as a replacement for DES.
Block ciphers are constructed by combining basic building blocks which consist mainly
of linear transformations or permutations, non-linear functions such as s-boxes, and mod-
ular addition. Usually, these building blocks are combined in units called rounds. The
Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) structures and Feistel (also referred to as DES-
like) structures are the two most commonly used designs for block cipher constructions [2].
2.1.1 Resource constrained block ciphers
Due to the tight cost and constrained resources of high volume consumer devices such as
RFID tags, smart cards and wireless sensor networks, it is desirable to employ lightweight
and specialized cryptographic primitives for many security applications. Several resource
constrained devices have limited capabilities in every aspect of computation, communica-
tion and storage. To secure these devices, lightweight cryptographic primitives are needed.
The gate constraints for security of low-cost tags are about 200-2000 gates which is
less than what is usually required by standard cryptographic primitives. Thus existing
cryptographic algorithms can be hardly implemented under such resource constraints. The
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resources required for AES are around 3600 Gate Equivalent (GE). While the exact imple-
mentation requirements for the primarily constrained resource algorithms, Tiny Encryption
Algorithm (TEA) [22], are not known, a crude estimate is that TEA needs at least 2100 GE
and XTEA [23] needs at least 2000 GE. Some of the most extensive proposals for low-cost
implementation are mCrypton [24], HIGHT [25], SEA [26], CGEN [27], PRESENT [28],
MIBS [29], and Hummingbird [13] (CGEN and Hummingbird are not classified as pure
block ciphers). The required gates for the hardware implementation of some of these en-
cryption algorithms are 2949 GE for mCrypton , 3048 GE for HIGHT, 2280 GE for SEA,
1570 GE for PRESENT and 1396 for MIBS.
2.2 Stream ciphers
Stream ciphers provide another alternative for block ciphers in applications requiring sym-
metric key encryption. Generally, compared to block ciphers, stream ciphers are preferred
in software applications with very high throughput requirements, and in hardware applica-
tions with restricted resources such as limited storage, gate count, or power consumption.
Stream ciphers can be though of as pseudorandom number generators that are initialed
by secret keys and, usually known, Initial Values (IVs). The encryption process is per-
formed by combining the plaintext with the produced key stream, usually through an XOR
operation.
Unlike the case for block ciphers, currently there is no specific standard for stream
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ciphers. However, two main projects are worth mentioning. The first one, the New Euro-
pean Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption (NESSIE), is a European research
project funded from 2000 to 2003 [30]. At the end of this project, none of the submitted
stream ciphers were selected because all of them were attacked. In 2004, a call for an-
other competition of stream ciphers proposals was issued by the Network of Excellence
within the Information Societies Technology (IST) Programme of the European Commis-
sion [31]. Thirty five stream cipher algorithms were submitted to the project, known as the
eSTREAM [32], at three profiles: Profile I (Software), Profile II (Hardware) and Profile
I+II (Software+Hardware). In 2008 and after three phases, four algorithms were selected
as Profile I and three stream ciphers were announced as Profile II as follows:
∙ Profile I (SW): HC-128 [33], Rabbit [34], Salsa20/12 [35] and SOSEMANUK [16].
∙ Profile II (HW): Grain [36], MICKEY [37] and Trivium [38].
Stream ciphers can be classified as synchronous and self-synchronizing or asynchronous.
A synchronous stream cipher is one in which the keystream is generated independent of the
plaintext message and of the ciphertext. Synchronization requirements, and no error prop-
agation are properties of synchronous stream ciphers. An asynchronous stream cipher is
one in which the previous ciphertext digits participate in computing the next keystream
word. Consequently, the keystream generated by an asynchronous stream cipher algorithm
is a function of the key and a fixed number of previous ciphertext digits. Some properties
of asynchronous stream ciphers are self-synchronization, limited error propagation, active
attacks and diffusion of plaintext statistics.
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Stream ciphers can also be classified with respect to their design components into shift
register based and non shift register based stream ciphers. RC4 [39], HC-128 [33] and
HC-256 [40] are examples for non shift register based steam ciphers. Shift register based
ciphers can be further divided into Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)-based and Non-
Linear Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR)-based structures. Due to inherent linearity of the
output of LFSRs sequences, its direct application in cryptography is restricted although its
produced sequences may have several good properties such as long period, balancedness
and good correlation properties. To eliminate this inherent linearity in LFSRs based stream
ciphers, one can use more than one LFSR and utilize a Non-Linear Combiner Generator
(NLCG) to remove the linearity of the produced sequence in a regularly clocked LFSR.
The nonlinear combining functions are required to have cryptographic properties such as
balance, high nonlinearity, correlation immunity, high algebraic degree and high algebraic
immunity degree [42] to ensure that the output of the stream cipher is secure. Another
method to improve the nonlinearity of the output sequence is through the use of Non-Linear
Filter Function (NLFF) which operates on a subset of the bits of the LFSR. Irregularly
clocked LFSRs were also proposed to improve the nonlinearity of stream ciphers [41]. In
this case, the underlying structure has more than one LFSR where each of them is clocked
at a different rate, independent of the others, at each step of the cipher iterations.
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2.3 Cryptanalysis of symmetric ciphers
Cryptanalysis is the study of techniques which attempt to defeat information security ser-
vices by compromising the underlying cryptographic schemes. Cryptanalysis of symmetric
key ciphers typically involves looking for attacks against block ciphers, stream ciphers and
MACs. There is a wide variety of cryptanalytic attacks and they can be classified by several
ways.
Based on the nature of the adversary, cryptanalytic techniques can be classified into
either passive attacks or active attacks. A passive attack is one where the adversary only
monitors the communication channel which only threatens the data confidentiality. On the
other hand, in an active attack, the attacker may attempt to delete, add, or change the trans-
mission on the channel. Data integrity, authentication and confidentiality are threatened by
this type of adversaries.
Another classification is based on the information available to the adversary. In this
case, cryptanalytic attacks can be classified as ciphertext-only attacks, known-plaintext at-
tacks, chosen-plaintext attacks, chosen-ciphertext attack, adaptive chosen-plaintext attacks
and adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks [2]. In a ciphertext-only attack, the cryptanalyst
has access only to the ciphertext and tries to recover the key or plaintext whereas in a
known-plaintext attack, the cryptanalyst has access to a ciphertext and its corresponding
plaintext. A chosen-plaintext attack is a cryptanalysis form in which the adversary may
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choose a plaintext and learn its corresponding ciphertext while in a chosen-ciphertext at-
tack, the attacker can choose ciphertexts and learn their corresponding plaintexts. In adap-
tive chosen-plaintext attack, the cryptanalyst makes a series of interactive queries, choosing
subsequent plaintexts based on the information from the previous encryptions. Finally, an
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack is an interactive model of chosen-ciphertext attacks in
which an attacker sends a number of ciphertexts to be decrypted, then uses the results of
these decryptions to select subsequent ciphertexts.
There is another classification of attacks with respect to whether the attacker has some
sort of physical access to the encrypting device or not. Pure mathematical attacks are
traditional cryptanalytic techniques that rely only on known or chosen input-output pairs
of the encryption function, and exploit the inner structure of the cipher to reveal secret key
information. On the contrary, in side channel attacks, it is assumed that the attacker has
some access to the encryption device, either by being able to make measurements with
respect to time or power consumption, or by being able to induce errors in the memory
of the device (fault analysis). The additional information gained by utilizing such a side
channel is then combined with methods that exploit the inner structure of the cipher to
reveal the secret key.
The success of a cryptanalytic attack is typically measured by the following complexi-
ties:
- Data complexity: The amount of plaintext/ciphertext information necessary to per-
form the attack.
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- Time complexity: The amount of necessary computations required to execute the
attack. For example, in the case of a brute force attack in which every key is trivially
examined, the number of operations is 2∣퐾∣−1 on average, where ∣퐾∣ denotes the size
of the key space in bits.
- Memory complexity: The amount of storage required by the algorithm that executes
the attack.
- Number of necessary physical actions on the encrypting device: This measure is rel-
evant only to side channel attacks and can include the number of necessary measure-
ments in case of side channel analysis (such as power analysis attacks and timing
attacks) or number of induced faults in the memory of the cipher, in case of fault
analysis.
2.3.1 Pure mathematical attacks of symmetric ciphers
In pure mathematical attacks, the adversary regards the problem as how to recover the
secret key given input/output pairs of the encryption algorithm from a purely mathematical
perspective without considering the physical implementation of the cipher.
There are various types of pure mathematical cryptanalysis models against symmetric
key ciphers. However, a set of generic cryptanalytic methods exists regardless whether the
cryptographic algorithm is a stream cipher or a block cipher. Brute force or exhaustive key
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search is the most trivial generic cryptanalytic method which can be applied to such algo-
rithms, independent of the design details. Besides, many other cryptanalytic methods in-
vestigate weaknesses of symmetric algorithms. In what follows, the intuition behind some
of the well-known cryptanalysis methods which are applicable to symmetric primitives is
given.
Linear cryptanalysis [43] is a known plaintext attack that utilizes the existence of any
linear relation, between some plaintext and ciphertext bits, that holds with probability dif-
ferent than 1
2
. Linear cryptanalysis was successfully applied by Matsui against DES in
1993. Later on, the attack was widely applied to many other block ciphers with different
degrees of success. The first step of linear cryptanalysis is to obtain a linear approximation
for the nonlinear blocks (e.g., s-boxes or non-linear combining functions). In this step, the
attacker utilizes approximations that hold with a large bias. The second step is to propa-
gate the achieved approximation throughout the other component of the cipher in order to
achieve an overall probabilistic linear relation that involves the plaintext, ciphrtext and the
key bits (as the only unknowns).
Differential cryptanalysis [44] is a general cryptanalytic method applicable primarily
to block ciphers, but was also applied recently to stream ciphers. In a very broad sense,
differential cryptanalysis studies how specific differences in the input of a particular trans-
formation affect the resulting output differences. As in linear cryptanalysis, the first step
of differential cryptanalysis is to find differential characteristics that hold with relatively
good probability for the different building blocks of the cipher. Then, these characteristics
are concatenated to form a differential for the overall cipher. Consequently, possible key
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values can be recovered from the desired output difference between two chosen or known
plaintext inputs.
Truncated differential cryptanalysis [45], impossible differential attacks [46], higher-
order differential cryptanalysis [47], and Boomerang attacks [48] are some well known
extensions of differential cryptanalysis.
Other attacks on block ciphers, independent of linear and differential cryptanalysis,
include the interpolation attacks [49], related key attacks [50], square attacks, integral at-
tacks, and multiset attacks [51,52]. Examples of dedicated cryptanalysis techniques against
stream ciphers include the correlation attacks [53] and the guess and determine attacks [54].
For modern stream and block ciphers, the above examples of pure mathematical at-
tacks are interesting, mainly, from a theoretical perspective but they typically require an
overwhelming computation and/or data complexity.
2.3.2 Side channel attacks
Side channel attacks concentrate on how to utilize the information leaked from physical
implementations of cryptographic modules during execution of the algorithm. Implemen-
tation dependent attacks, i.e., side channel attacks, present a serious threat for many appli-
cations of symmetric key primitives which are widely deployed in many devices such as
TV set-top boxes, prepaid cards and smart cards.
In the side channel attacks, the cryptanalyst is assumed to have some physical access
to the particular device that performs the encryption. Certain parameters such as the in-
stantaneous power consumption of the cryptographic device or the time used to perform
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the encryption operation can be measured. In some of these attacks, the attacker is also
assumed to be able to induce errors in the memory of the device or at a particular step
of the computation process of the device (fault analysis). In other words, the leakage of
information can be extracted by analyzing timing measurements, power consumption or
electromagnetic radiations. Besides, other forms of side channel information can be avail-
able as a result of hardware or software failures which can be cleverly introduced into the
cryptographic device by changing the operating frequency or temperature beyond the al-
lowed limits or by other dedicated methods of fault injection. By utilizing this side channel
information, the attacker might be able to deduce some information about the encrypting
process which leads to recovering the key.
Anderson et al. [55] categorize side channel attacks into the following four classes:
- Invasive Attacks: These attacks require a direct physical access to the internal ele-
ments of the cryptographic modules. For instance, the attacker may reach the layer
of the cryptographic module and put a microprobing needle on a data bus to record,
and later analyze, the data transfer. Several defensive measures are usually imple-
mented in hardware to efficiently limit invasive attacks. For example, if tampering
is detected, some cryptographic modules with higher security level reset all their
memories [56].
- Semi-invasive Attacks: In these attacks, the adversary can access the device but with-
out inducing a physical damage to the chip or making unauthorized electrical inter-
face connection. For example, in fault analysis attacks, the attacker may utilize a
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laser beam to ionize the device to change some of its memory data and finally alter
the device output [5].
- Local non-invasive Attacks: In this class of attacks, the cryptanalyst needs close
investigation or manipulation of the device’s operation. For example, from the power
analysis point of view, the attacker can observe the current drawn by the processor
precisely. Then, the cryptographic keys can be recovered by means of measuring the
correlation of the mentioned parameter with the computations being performed by
the device.
- Remote attacks: These attacks require only observation or manipulation of the de-
vice’s normal input and output. There are various types of attack that are independent
of the distance between the attacker and the cryptographic device. Timing analysis,
protocol analysis and attacks on application programming interfaces belong to this
group.
Each of these types of attacks may also be classified as passive or active depending on
assumptions regarding the control executed by the attacker over the computation process.
In passive attacks, the normal operations of the device are not affected, i.e., the adversary
can collect information about the operation of the target system without disturbing its nor-
mal task. In active attacks, the attacker can interfere with the device inputs or environment
to change the normal operation while the target system may or may not be able to detect
such an influence.
Among various kinds of side channel attacks, timing attacks [3], power analysis attacks
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[4] and fault attacks [6] are the three most well-known and widely studied attacks. Other
types of side channel attacks include electromagnetic attacks [57,58], acoustic attacks [59]
and cold boot attacks [60, 61].
Timing attacks, introduced in 1996 by Kocher [3] against RSA, are the first type of
modern side channel attacks presented in the open academic literature. The basic idea of the
timing attack comes from the fact that typical implementations of cryptographic algorithms
execute the computations in a non-fixed time. Whenever these operations involve secret
parameters, they should be considered as a potential risk because these timing variations
can leak some useful information about the secret parameters. By careful study of the
obtained timing statistics, one can recover these secret parameters. A common method
to prevent timing attacks is that all operations should be designed to take the same time
duration. In case this is not achievable, some rough timing disturbance can be applied by
introducing random timing shifts and wait states or by adding dummy instructions. To
increase the number of ciphertexts required by the adversary, random delays can be added
to the processing time. Generally, the number of required samples increases approximately
as the square of the timing noise [3].
Power analysis attacks are another powerful form of side channel attacks which utilize
the correlation between the power consumption of cryptographic devices and the secret
parameters used in the cryptographic computations performed by these devices. These at-
tacks, which were proposed in 1998 by Kocher et al. [4], can non-invasively extract secret
information, such as cryptographic keys, from the device by measuring the instantaneous
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power consumption from the running cryptographic operations that involve the desired se-
cret parameters. Unlike the timing analysis, power analysis attacks are mainly applicable to
hardware implementations. There are two general types of power analysis attack: Simple
Power Analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). In SPA attacks, the attacker
tries to guess which particular instruction is being carried out at a specific time from the
measured power traces as well as the input and output values of this instruction. In con-
trast to SPA, DPA is a more advanced form of power analysis that needs no knowledge of
implementation details. In DPA attacks, the adversary computes the intermediate values
within cryptographic computations by statistically analyzing data collected from multiple
cryptographic operations. To alleviate power analysis attacks, one can modify the design
of the hardware device to randomize its power consumption or to equalize the power con-
sumption of all operations to make it independent of the processed secret values. Another
commonly used countermeasure method against power analysis attacks is the data masking
technique, which can be applied at the software or hardware level [62, 63].
In fault analysis attacks, the cryptanalyst applies some kinds of physical influence, such
as ionizing radiation, on the internal state of the cryptosystem which influence the crypto-
graphic primitive execution or memory. By carefully studying the results of computations
performed under such faults, the attacker can retrieve information about the secret key. In
1996, Boneh et al. [6] introduced fault analysis by describing an attack that targets the RSA
public key cryptosystem and exploits a faulty Chinese Remainder Theorem computation to
factor the modulus 푛. Subsequently, fault analysis attacks were extended to symmetric
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systems such as DES [7] and later to AES [8]. Fault analysis attacks became a more se-
rious threat after cheap and low-tech methods of applying faults were presented [5]. Fault
attacks against stream ciphers were introduced by Hoch et al [9], where attacks against
LILI-128 and SOBER-t32 and RC4 were described. Other stream ciphers that were ana-
lyzed in the fault analysis model include SNOW 3G [64], Trivium [65], HC-128 [10] and
Rabbit [11, 12].
The number of required faults in the above fault attacks varies depending on the as-
sumed fault analysis model. In general, all models follow the one given in Armknecht et
al. [66], which assumes that the attacker has access to the physical device, and that the
attacker is able to reset the device to the same unknown initial settings as often as needed.
However, different assumptions with respect to the amount of control the attacker has over
the induced faults are utilized. For example, the attacker may have control over the loca-
tion of the faulted memory register, or may be able to restrict the Hamming weight of the
induced faults. For instance, Biham et al. [67] assumed a model in which the attacker can
choose the exact location (register) of the fault which causes RC4 to enter a special inner
state and makes its recovery a trivial task. Similarly, Armknecht et al. [66] described a
fault analysis attack against SNOW 2.0 where they assumed that the fault occurs exactly in
a particular register of the cipher. On the other hand, in the fault analysis of Trivium [65],
it is assumed that the attacker has no control or knowledge over the fault position. Differ-
ent assumptions also exist regarding the Hamming weight of induced faults. For instance,
in [10], it is assumed that the fault causes a 1-bit flip in the inner state of the cipher, whereas
in [67], it is assumed that the fault is localized in one byte of the inner state.
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Fault analysis attacks have also been applied to several block ciphers [7, 68–70]. The
basic idea of the differential fault attack against SPN-based block ciphers is to use the
diffusion property of the last linear transformation layer in order to determine whether the
difference before the last nonlinear layer possibly originates in a fault or not. In particular,
the adversary induces a fault as a differential input of the last linear transform and looks
at the corresponding differential output. This provides the attacker with a distinguishing
criteria for the last round key. More details on this class of attacks can be found in [69].
To secure cryptographic devices against fault analysis, proper countermeasures have to
be applied. Generally, these countermeasures try to detect any temporal or permanent faults
which happen in the cryptosystem, and then, immediately, disable the device output or rest
all the output bits to 0s. As a result, the attacker will be prevented from observing the output
of the faulty cryptographic computations and hence the vulnerability of the cryptosystem to
these attacks can be alleviated. Several approaches of fault detection techniques have been
investigated. These techniques include error detecting codes (EDCs) and redundancy-based
techniques (RBT) [71, 72].
In addition to the above mentioned side channel attacks and models, another technique,
called scan based side channel attack, was recently introduced to recover secret keys from
hardware implementation of cryptographic devices that are designed with some built-in
testability features. In the proposed model [73], the attacker first locates all the scan ele-
ments of the scan chain by scanning out the internal state in the test mode after loading pairs
of known plaintexts with one-bit difference in the normal mode. In [73], the secret key was
determined by using the structure of the DES s-boxes and three additional plaintexts. This
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attack was also applied to stream ciphers [74, 75].
The flipped scan technique [76] was proposed to mitigate scan based side channel at-
tacks. In this technique, inverters are introduced at random points in the scan chain. The
authors in [76] claimed that the required security is reached when the inverter positions
cannot be guessed with a probability significantly greater than 1
2
. However, Agrawal et
al. showed that this technique was vulnerable to the reset attack [74]. To prevent this at-
tack, they also proposed another protection mechanism, called the XOR-chain, in which
XOR gates are inserted at random points in the scan chain [74]. In this scheme, each XOR
gate acts as a data-dependent inverter which conditionally changes the current input of the
flip-flop based on the preceding one. As a result, the new method using XOR chains has




Differential Fault Analysis of
SOSEMANUK
3.1 Introduction
SOSEMANUK [16] is a fast software-oriented stream cipher that has passed all the three
phases of the ECRYPT eSTREAM competition and is currently a member of the eS-
TREAM Profile 1 (software portfolio). It uses a 128-bit initialization vector and allows
keys of either 128-bit or 256-bits, whereas the claimed security is always 128-bits. The
design of SOSEMANUK (See Figure 2) is based on the SNOW2.0 stream cipher [77] and
utilizes elements of the Serpent block cipher [78]. SOSEMANUK aims to fix weaknesses of
the SNOW 2.0 design and achieves better performance, notably in the ciphers initialization
phase. Also, the secret inner state of SOSEMANUK is reduced when compared to SNOW
2.0 and amounts to 384 bits.
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The preliminary analysis [16], conducted during the SOSEMANUK design process, in-
cludes the assessment of the cipher with respect to different cryptanalytic attacks such as
correlation attacks, distinguishing attacks and algebraic attacks. Public analysis followed
and SOSEMANUK was assessed in [79] by Ahmadi et al. where a guess-and-determine
attack requiring 2226 operations and 24 keystream words was provided. Another improved
guess-and-determine attack was presented by Tsunoo et al. in [80]. A correlation attack
on SOSEMANUK was presented by Jung-Keun Lee et al. [81] with a computational com-
plexity of 2147.88 and success probability 99% to recover the initial secret inner state. The
data requirement for the attack was relaxed by Cho et al. [82]. In 2009, Lin et al. [83]
improved the guess-and-determine attack, achieving complexity of 24 word keystream us-
ing 2192 steps. Another guess-and-determine attack with time complexity 2176 was recently
presented by Feng et al. in Asiacrypt 2010 [84].
In this chapter, we present a fault analysis attack on SOSEMANUK. The fault analysis
model adopted in the chapter is the one in which the attacker is assumed to be able corrupt
a random inner state register in between the iterations of the cipher but the attacker has no
control or knowledge over which inner state register has been corrupted. Also, the attacker
is assumed to be able to reinitialize the cipher with the same key and IV arbitrary number
of times. The attack recovers the secret inner state without recovering the key and requires
about 6144 faults, 248 operations each equivalent to one SOSEMANUK iteration and the
storage of about 238.17 bytes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief
overview of fault analysis attacks. In section 3.2, relevant details of SOSEMANUK are
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reviewed. An overview of the proposed attack is provided in section 3.3. Details of the
attack are described in section 3.4 and section 3.5. Finally, the conclusion is given in
section 5.5.
3.2 The SOSEMANUK specifications
The following notation will be utilized throughout the rest of the chapter:
- 푥푖: 푖-th bit of an 푛-bit word 푥
- ⊞,× : addition and multiplication modulo 232, respectively
- ⊕ : bit-wise XOR
- <<< : left rotation defined on 32 bit values
- ∣ :concatenation
- 푋푖 = 푓 푖푡+3∣푓 푖푡+2∣푓 푖푡+1∣푓 푖푡 : input value for 푖-th s-box applied in the Serpent1 function
at some step 푡 (the 푡 value will be clear from the context). The Serpent1 function,
shown in Figure 1, is defined by 32 applications of 푆 in the bit-slice mode, where
푆 = [8, 6, 7, 9, 3, 12, 10, 15, 13, 1, 14, 4, 0, 11, 5, 2]
is the s-box used in the third s-box layer of the Serpent block cipher [78].
- ´: Sign for denoting faulty cipher registers or output. For example 푠′0 will denote the
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Figure 1: The Serpent1 function
While the claimed security level of SOSEMANUK is 128 bits, it supports a variable key
length of 128 or 256 bits and 128 bit initialization value. As depicted in Figure 2, the secret
inner state of SOSEMANUK consists of 12 32-bit words (푠0, . . . , 푠9, 푅1, 푅2) and utilizes
three main components to generate the keystream output: a linear feedback shift register
(LFSR), a finite state machine (FSM) and an s-box-like function, Serpent1. To update the
LFSR, the following recurrent relation is applied:
푠푡+10 = 푠푡+9 ⊕ 훼−1푠푡+3 ⊕ 훼푠푡 (1)
where 훼 is a root of the primitive polynomial 푃 (푋) = 푋4+훽23푋3+훽245푋2+훽48푋+훽239
















Figure 2: Overview of the SOSEMANUK stream cipher
The FSM update procedure is defined as follows:
푅1푡+1 = (푅2푡 ⊞푚푢푥(푙푠푏(푅1푡), 푠푡+1, 푠푡+1 ⊕ 푠푡+8)) (2)
푅2푡+1 = (푇푟푎푛푠(푅1푡)) (3)
where 푚푢푥(푐, 푥, 푦) =
⎧⎨⎩
푥 푖푓 푐 = 0
푦 푖푓 푐 = 1
, Trans(x)=(M × x) <<< 7 and 푀 = 0푥54655307.
The FSM output at each step is defined by
푓푡 = (푠푡+9 ⊞푅1푡+1)⊕푅2푡+1 (4)
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The inner state right after the initialization is denoted by (푠0, . . . , 푠9, 푅10, 푅20). At each
step, first the FSM is updated and the 푓푡 and 푠푡 values are preserved in the internal buffer,
then the LFSR is updated. Once every four steps, a 128-bit word is generated by
푧푡∣푧푡+1∣푧푡+2∣푧푡+3 = 푆푒푟푝푒푛푡1(푓푡∣푓푡+1∣푓푡+2∣푓푡+3)⊕ 푠푡∣푠푡+1∣푠푡+2∣푠푡+3. (5)
For a more detailed description of SOSEMANUK, the reader is referred to [16].
3.3 The attack overview
In this section, we provide a high level overview of the proposed attack. According to
our fault analysis model, the attacker is assumed to be able to re-initialize the cipher an
arbitrary number of times. Furthermore, while we assume that each induced fault corrupts
only one of the 12 inner state registers, the attacker does not know, and cannot control the
position or the new value of the faulted register.
3.3.1 The main idea
The main idea of the attack can be explained as follows. In every SOSEMANUK iteration,
32 s-boxes are applied in the bit-slice mode as a part of the Serpent1 function. The first part
of the attack restricts the input for each of the s-boxes by considering faults that occur at
푠5 and 푠4. Consider the case where the fault has been injected right after the SOSEMANUK









































Figure 3: The Δ푓 values corresponding to the case where 푠4 is faulted
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in which the 푧0∣푧1∣푧2∣푧3 128-bit keystream word is produced, the fault moves in the right-
hand direction as the LFSR is clocked for 4 times. In particular, no faulty values participate
in generation of 푓0. Furthermore, since in every step, first the FSM is updated and then
the 푓푡 value is computed and finally the LFSR is clocked, 푓1 and 푓2 are computed without
error and the fault affects only 푓3. Now the non-faulty 푓0, 푓1, 푓2 and the faulty 푓3 enter
the Serpent1 function. In the bit-slice mode, the Serpent1 function applies 32 s-boxes 4-bit
inputs, where 푖-th bit comes from register 푓푖, 푖 = 0, . . . 3 (See Figure 1). Thus, the input
difference of all activated s-boxes will be equal to 0푥8 (1000 in binary). The attacker can
then retrieve the corresponding s-box output difference and restrict the set of candidates for
the s-box input-output values. When the fault occurs at register 푠5, each s-box output will
be faulted with probability 1
2
, which allows us to establish a criterion to recognize faults in
register 푠5. Similarly, in the case where the fault occurs at 푠4, it propagates as shown in
Figure 3 potentially affecting only 푓2 and 푓3. In other words, only the two most significant
bits of every s-box input might be affected. Since a criterion for recognizing faults at 푠4
can also be established, observing the output s-box differences for such faults also reduces
the set of candidates for the s-box input-output values.
After the candidates for the s-box input-output values have been restricted, equation (5)
is used to provide a restriction on the LFSR registers. From (1), it follows that the LFSR
registers are not independent and restrictions on the LFSR registers can be coupled with the
dependence of the LFSR registers to further prune the candidates for the 푠푡 values. Finally,
a guess and determine attack is used to find the rest of the inner state.
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3.3.2 The steps of the attack
The attack can be divided into two phases. The first phase collects faulty output in four
different steps of the cipher execution and can be summarized as follows:
- For 푙 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 4}
- Repeat the steps below for 푚 times
- Reinitialize the cipher
- Iterate for 푙 times
- Induce a fault, corrupting a random inner state register
- Collect and store the keystream output word 푧′4푙∣푧′4푙+1∣푧′4푙+2∣푧′4푙+3
The second phase, which uses the collected information to uniquely determine the secret
inner state, can be summarized as follows:
(1) Use the faulty outputs gathered in the first phase of the attack for 푙 ∈ {0, 2, 4} to re-
duce the number of candidates for (푠0, 푠1, 푠2, 푠3), (푠8, 푠9, 푠10, 푠11) and (푠16, 푠17, 푠18, 푠19)
to 232 each. Then, use dependencies between the three fourplets imposed by relation
(1) to further reduce the corresponding numbers of candidates (details are explained
in section 3.4)
(2) Similar to the previous step, using the information collected in the first phase of the
attack for 푙 = 1, reduce the number of candidates for (푠4, 푠5, 푠6, 푠7) to 232 (details are
explained in section 3.4)
33
(3) Apply the guess-and-determine strategy through the space reduced sets of candidates
obtained by previous two steps to recover the complete inner state (details are ex-
plained in section 3.5)
In the first phase of attack, data is collected for 푙 = 4 and not for 푙 = 3 since the LFSR
registers candidate sets due to 푙 = 0, 푙 = 2 and 푙 = 4 are correlated and allow further
reduction. The reduction due to 푙 = 1 is used later in the guess-and-determine attack.
3.4 Reducing the number of candidates for LFSR regis-
ters (푠0, 푠1, 푠2, 푠3) and (푠8, 푠9, 푠10, 푠11)
The starting number of candidates for the LFSR registers (푠0, 푠1, 푠2, 푠3) and (푠8, 푠9, 푠10, 푠11)
is 2128 each. In this section, first we show how to reduce this number to 232 and then, by
exploiting the fact that the two register components are linked by relation (1), reduce it
further to 216, each.
3.4.1 Recovering the s-box differences
Let SOSEMANUK be in state 푡 = 0. From (5) and since 푧0∣푧1∣푧2∣푧3 is accessible to the
attacker, it is evident that reducing the uncertainty for 푓0∣푓1∣푓2∣푓3 leads to reducing the
uncertainty of 푠0∣푠1∣푠2∣푠3. In this subsection, the 푓0∣푓1∣푓2∣푓3 value is constrained by calcu-
lating the s-box input-output differences using the faulty information. Since the algorithms
below are also applied to constraint 푓4∣푓5∣푓6∣푓7, 푓8∣푓9∣푓10∣푓11 and 푓16∣푓17∣푓18∣푓19, these al-
gorithms are specified for general time 푡 and will be used for 푡 ∈ {0, 4, 8, 16}.
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Define 훿푖 and Δ푖 by
훿푖 = 푆(푋푖 ⊕ 0x8)⊕ 푆(푋푖),
Δ푖 = {푆(푋푖 ⊕ 0x4)⊕ 푆(푋푖), 푆(푋푖 ⊕ 0x푐)⊕ 푆(푋푖)}
for every 푖 = 0, . . . 31. Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, described below, are used to recover
훿푖 and Δ푖, respectively, for each 푖 = 0, . . . 31.
In what follows, the probability distribution of the number of non-activated s-boxes in
the SOSEMANUK output is analyzed. In particular, probabilities of the event that there will
be more than 16 non-activated s-boxes are estimated under different assumptions about the
location of the fault. For that purpose, let 0 ≤ 푛 ≤ 32 be a random variable which denotes
the number of s-boxes that are not active in the application of the 32 s-boxes of Serpent1
in some steps of a faulty SOSEMANUK instance. Consider for example the probability
that a particular s-box will not be activated given that the fault has occurred at 푠0. In that
case, only the 3 most significant bits of the s-box input may be corrupted. Note that, due
to (5) by which the corrupted 푠0 is XOR-ed to the least significant bits of each s-box, it
may also happen that the difference in the s-box output caused by the s-box input cancels
out. However, such a possibility has been ruled out by exhaustively checking that for each
s-box input value it is not possible to cause a difference only in the least significant bit of
the s-box output by any of the differences in the 3 most significant bits of the input. Thus,
the probability that the particular s-box has not been activated is 2−3. Now, it is clear that
variable 푛 ∼ 퐵(2−3, 32), i.e., 푛 follows binomial distribution with parameters 푝 = 2−3 and
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푛 = 32. According to the binomial distribution, 푃 [16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31] = ∑31푖=16 (32푖 )푝푖(1 −
푝)32−푖 ≈ 2−21. More generally, the distribution of 푛 in terms of the fault position is given
follows:
- {푠0} : 푃 [16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31] ≈ 2−21 as explained above.
- {푠1, 푠9, 푅1, 푅2}: all four s-box input bits may be corrupted. Hence, 푛 ∼ 퐵(2−4, 32).
For the fault position 푠1, the possibility of cancelling out the s-box output difference
has been ruled out the same way as in the case of 푠0. Using the binomial distribution,
it follows that 푃 [16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31] is negligible.
- {푠8}: if 푅100 = 0, then, 푛 = 0 with probability 1. Otherwise, all four s-box input bits
may be corrupted and 푛 ∼ 퐵(2−4, 32) and as for the previous case, 푃 [16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31]
is negligible.
- {푠2, 푠3}: only the least significant bit will certainly not be corrupted. For 푠3, the
cancellation of the s-box output difference is ruled out as in the case of 푠0. In case of
푠2, there exists one s-box input such that the s-box output difference can be cancelled
out by inverting the second most significant bit (푆(1111) = 푆(1111⊕1110)⊕0100).
Approximating 푛 ∼ 퐵(2−3, 32) gives 푃 [16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31] ≈ 2−21.
- {푠4}: the most significant two bits may be corrupted, from which it follows that
푛 ∼ 퐵(2−2, 32). So, 푃 [16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31] ≈ 0.002.
- {푠6, 푠7}: no s-box input bits can be corrupted and thus 푛 = 32 with probability 1
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- {푠5}: Only the most significant bit of every s-box input may be corrupted. Thus
푛 ∼ 퐵(1
2
, 32) and 푃 [16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31] =∑31푖=16 (32푖 ) 12푖 12(32−푖) = 0.569.
From the above reasoning, it follows that when the fault does not occur at 푠5, 푃 [16 ≤ 푛 ≤
31] ≈ 1
11
× 0.02 ≈ 0.0018, where 1
11
is the probability that the fault occurred at 푠4, given
that it did not occur at 푠5. On the other hand, if the fault occurred at 푠5, the probability of
event 16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31 is equal to 0.569. This analysis indicates that one can decide whether
the fault occurred at 푠5 or not by verifying whether 16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31, or not, respectively.
In Algorithm 1, keystream words for which 16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31 are considered. Namely, once
such a keystream word have been found, the values of activated s-boxes are used to learn
about the corresponding 훿푖 values. According to the discussion above, if the fault indeed oc-
curred at 푠5, such differences necessarily represent the s-box output difference for the input
difference equal to 0푥8. To diminish the possibility of false positives (event 16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31
takes place, but the fault does not occur at 푠5), the final output difference value is taken as
the most frequent difference candidate taken over different faulty keystream words at the
(fixed) SOSEMANUK step in question, for which 16 ≤ 푛 ≤ 31 holds.
Algorithm 1
- Initialize 32 multisets: 퐶푎푛푑1(푘) = ∅, 푘 = 0, . . . , 31.
- For each faulty keystream word 푧′푡∣푧′푡+1∣푧′푡+2∣푧′푡+3, such that








푡∣푧푖푡+1∣푧푖푡+2∣푧푖푡+3 : 푖 = 0, . . . 31} ≤ 31 (6)
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do:
- For each 0 ≤ 푘 ≤ 31, if 푑 = 푧′푘푡 ∣푧′푘푡+1∣푧′푘푡+2∣푧′푘푡+3 ⊕ 푧푘푡 ∣푧푘푡+1∣푧푘푡+2∣푧푘푡+3 is different
than 0, add 푑 to 퐶푎푛푑1(푘).
- Return the most frequent element in the multiset 퐶푎푛푑1(푖) as 훿푖 = 푆(푋푖 ⊕ 0x8) ⊕
푆(푋푖), for each 0 ≤ 푖 ≤ 31.
The overall number of required fault injections 푚 = 1536 has been determined by
incrementing 푚 in steps of 128 and experimentally verifying that Algorithm 1 always re-
covers the correct 훿푖 = 푆(푋푖 ⊕ 0푥8) ⊕ 푆(푋푖), 푖 = 0, . . . 31 for 1000 randomly initialized
instants of SOSEMANUK.
Algorithm 2 uses 훿푖 recovered by Algorithm 1 to find the sets Δ푖, 푖 = 0, . . . 31. In
particular, the algorithm recognizes faulty keystream words that correspond to an error in
register 푠4 and then uses the s-box output differences in such keystream words to deduce
Δ푖 for 푖 = 0, . . . 31.
The criterion for recognizing faults in register 푠4 is similar to the previously stated cri-
terion for recognizing faults in 푠5. However, instead of asking for 16 or more unactivated
s-boxes, we expect to have more than 16 s-boxes which are either unactivated or with output
difference equals to 훿푖. Namely, let 푣 be the number of s-boxes in one step of SOSEMANUK
which are either not activated, or activated by an input difference of 0푥8. The probability
of the event that one s-box is either not activated, or activated by an input difference of 0푥8
depends on the location where the fault occurred. In case the error is in register 푠4, the
probability in question will be 1
2
since in that case only the 2 most significant bits of the
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s-box input may be faulted and the input difference has to among 0푥0, 0푥8, 0푥푐 and 0푥4
values. Thus, if the fault is in 푠4, 푣 ∼ 퐵(12 , 32), and 푃 [16 ≤ 푣 ≤ 31] = 0.569. On the other
hand, if the fault occurs at some other register, say at 푅1, all four s-box input bits may be
corrupted and the probability that the input difference will be either 0푥8 or 0푥0 is signifi-
cantly smaller. Again, this gives a methodology to decided whether the fault occurred at 푠4
or not by counting the number of s-boxes which reacted with difference of either 훿푖 (using
the corresponding 푖) or 0. Once the faults due to an error in register 푠4 are recognized,
finding the sets Δ푖 proceeds with the following logic. When a keystream word for which
the event 16 ≤ 푣 ≤ 31 took place has been found, the output s-box differences which are
not due to input difference of 0푥8 or 0푥0 have to be due to difference 0푥푐 or 0푥4. Again,
to diminish the possibility of false positives (i.e., 16 ≤ 푣 ≤ 31 but the fault does not occur
at 푠4), the final output set is taken as the set with two most frequent difference candidates
for the difference taken over different faulty keystream words at the SOSEMANUK step in
question for which 16 ≤ 푣 ≤ 31 holds.
Algorithm 2
- Initialize 32 multisets: 퐶푎푛푑2,3(푘) = ∅, 푘 = 0, . . . , 31.
- For each faulty keystream output word 푧′푡∣푧′푡+1∣푧′푡+2∣푧′푡+3, such that
16 ≤ #{푧′푖푡 ∣푧′푖푡+1∣푧′푖푡+2∣푧′푖푡+3 = 푧푖푡∣푧푖푡+1∣푧푖푡+2∣푧푖푡+3∣푖 = 0, . . . 31}+
#{푧′푖푡 ∣푧′푖푡+1∣푧′푖푡+2∣푧′푖푡+3 ⊕ 푧푖푡∣푧푖푡+1∣푧푖푡+2∣푧푖푡+3 = 훿푖∣푖 = 0, . . . 31} ≤ 31
(7)
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where 훿푖, 0 ≤ 푖 ≤ 31 has been recovered by Algorithm 1, do:
- For each 0 ≤ 푘 ≤ 31, add each 푑 = 푧′푘푡 ∣푧′푘푡+1∣푧′푘푡+2∣푧′푘푡+3 ⊕ 푧푘푡 ∣푧푘푡+1∣푧푘푡+2∣푧푘푡+3 such
that 푑 /∈ {0, 훿푘} to the multiset 퐶푎푛푑2,3(푘).
- Return the two highest occurring elements in the multiset 퐶푎푛푑2,3(푖) as the required
two-element set Δ푖, for each 푖.
For the above choice of total number of faults 푚 = 1536, Algorithm 2 always suc-
ceeded in recovering the sets Δ푖, 푖 = 0, . . . 31, for 1000 randomly initialized instants of
SOSEMANUK.
3.4.2 Restricting the number of candidates for the LFSR registers
In each SOSEMANUK step, in which a 128-bit keystream word is produced, according to
(5), 32 4 × 4 s-boxes are applied. In the previous subsection, it has been shown how to
use the faulty information to deduce the s-box output differences for certain input s-box
differences. Naturally, these evaluated input-output differences impose a constraint on the
actual input-output values. In this subsection, the sets of possible s-box input-output values
are deduced and the effect of the deduced input-output s-box values constraints on the
number of candidates for the LFSR registers (푠0, 푠1, 푠2, 푠3) is presented.
Having determined the 훿푖 value and the two-element set Δ푖 by Algorithms 1 and 2, for
each 0 ≤ 푖 ≤ 31, the actual input-output values for the s-box are deduced according to
Table 1. As can be noted from the table, in case the s-box input is even, the input-output
value can be deduced uniquely. On the other hand, in case when the s-box input value is
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훿푖,Δ푖 푖-th s-box input 푖-th s-box output
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Table 1: Determining the s-box input-output values based on sets 훿푖 and Δ푖
odd, there exist four candidates for the s-box input-output.
Assuming a uniform distribution on the s-box input values, it is expected that the at-
tacker will deduce 64 out of 128 output bits. For the remaining 64 bits, it will be composed
out of 16 4-bit values, each restricted to 4 candidates. The overall number of candidates for
the 128-bit value 푆푒푟푝푒푛푡1(푓0∣푓1∣푓2∣푓3) is then 416 = 232. Since we have
푧0∣푧1∣푧2∣푧3 = 푆푒푟푝푒푛푡1(푓0∣푓1∣푓2∣푓3)⊕ 푠0∣푠1∣푠2∣푠3 (8)
and 푧0∣푧1∣푧2∣푧3 is known, it follows that there will be 232 candidates for 푠0∣푠1∣푠2∣푠3.
The number of candidates for 푠4∣푠5∣푠6∣푠7, 푠8∣푠9∣푠10∣푠11 and 푠16∣푠17∣푠18∣푠19 can be re-
stricted in a similar way. Namely, for that purpose, Algorithms 1 and 2 need to be applied
using 푧4∣푧5∣푧6∣푧7, 푧8∣푧9∣푧10∣푧11 and 푧16∣푧17∣푧18∣푧19 and the faulty values obtained by the first
phase of the attack described in section 3.3 for 푙 = 1, 푙 = 2 and 푙 = 4, respectively. Then,
Table 1 is utilized to restrict the s-box input-output values occurring in steps 푡 = 1, 푡 = 2
and 푡 = 4. Following the procedure explained in this section, it follows that 푠4∣푠5∣푠6∣푠7,
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푠8∣푠9∣푠10∣푠11 and 푠16∣푠17∣푠18∣푠19 are expected to be restricted to 232 candidates each.
3.4.3 Further pruning of the LFSR registers candidates
In the previous subsection, the uncertainty for (푠0, 푠1,푠2, 푠3), (푠8, 푠9,푠10, 푠11) and (푠16,푠17,
푠18,푠19) values has been reduced. In this subsection, we note that these three four-tuples of
32-bit values are not independent. Namely, according to (1), we have 푠10 = 푠9 ⊕ 훼−1푠3 ⊕
훼푠0 and 푠18 = 푠17⊕훼−1푠11⊕훼푠8. These two relations are used to further prune candidates
for (푠0, 푠1, 푠2, 푠3) and (푠8, 푠9, 푠10, 푠11). More precisely, after the end of the process, the
attacker is left with 216 candidates for
(푓0, 푓1, 푓2, 푓3, 푠0, 푠1, 푠2, 푠3, 푓8, 푓9, 푓10, 푓11, 푠8, 푠9, 푠10, 푠11) (9)
The two relations from the previous paragraph can be rewritten as
훼−1푠3 ⊕ 훼푠0 = 푠10 ⊕ 푠9 (10)
훼−1푠11 ⊕ 훼푠8 = 푠18 ⊕ 푠17 (11)
Before stating the candidate reduction procedure, we note that the candidates for (푠0, 푠1, 푠2, 푠3)
are specified in a way which allows listing them in a table efficiently. In particular, the can-
didate set for (푠0, 푠1, 푠2, 푠3) is specified by sets 퐵푖, 푖 = 0, . . . 31, such that 푠푖0∣푠푖1∣푠푖2∣푠푖3 ∈ 퐵푖.
Then, each element of the set 퐵0 ×퐵1 × . . .×퐵31 specifies one (푠0, 푠1, 푠2, 푠3) value. The
sets of candidates for (푠8, 푠9,푠10, 푠11) and (푠16, 푠17, 푠18, 푠19) can be transformed to a list in
42
the same way and this property is used in step (1) and step (5) of the procedure below.
1. List all of the (푠0, 푠1, 푠2, 푠3) and (푠16, 푠17, 푠18, 푠19) candidates and call the two gener-
ated tables 푇1 and 푇3, respectively. Include also the columns containing (푓0, 푓1, 푓2, 푓3)
and (푓16, 푓17, 푓18, 푓19) in 푇1 and 푇3, respectively. Create an empty table 푇 .
2. Extend 푇1 by adding a column with the left-hand side of equation (10).
3. Extend 푇3 by adding a column with the right-hand side of equation (11).
4. Sort 푇1 and 푇3 by columns added in steps (2) and (3).
5. For each candidate for (푠8, 푠9, 푠10, 푠11)
5.1. Calculate the left-hand side of equation (11). If there does not exists an element
in 푇3 such that (11) holds, go to the next (푠8, 푠9, 푠10, 푠11) candidate (step (5)).
5.2. Otherwise, calculate the right-hand side of equation (10) and find rows of 푇1
for which (10) holds. For each such row, add the complete row of the form (9)
to table 푇 .
To find the expected size of table 푇 , note that it is expected that 16 bits of the 푇3 table
column containing 푠18 ⊕ 푠17 value are constant, due to the fact that 16 out of 32 s-box






19) have been recovered uniquely by the procedure
in the previous subsection. On the other hand, no constant bits are expected to exist in
훼−1푠11⊕훼푠8 values due to randomization resulting from multiplying by 훼 and 훼−1. Thus,
about 216 candidates for (푠8, 푠9, 푠10, 푠11), with the corresponding (푓8, 푓9, 푓10, 푓11), will pass
the elimination step (5.1).
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In step (5.2), the remaining 216 candidates are joined with 푇1, which contains 232 rows,
according to (10). Since there exists no fixed bits in the 훼−1푠3 ⊕ 훼푠0 column of 푇1, it is
expected that around 216 will be present in the output of the join step, i.e., in table 푇 . Since
both 푇1 and 푇3 contain 9 32-bit words in each row and table 푇 contains 16 32-bit words
in each row, the required memory space for the previous procedure is 2 × 232 × 9 × 4 +
216 × 16 × 4 = 238.17 bytes. The computational cost is equal to sorting two tables of 232
rows, executing a search in a sorted table of length 232 for 232 times and finally executing a
search for 216 times in the sorted table of 232 entries. By noting that sorting tables of length
푛 takes 푂(푛푙표푔(푛)) steps and that a binary search in the sorted table requires 푂(푙표푔(푛))
steps, the overall cost is about 232 × 32× 2 + 232 × 32 + 216 × 32 = 238.585 operations.
3.5 Recovering the rest of the inner state
In the previous subsections, we have reduced the LFSR complexity to 232 candidates for
(푠4, 푠5, 푠6, 푠7) and 216 candidates for the registers present in (9). In this subsection, a guess-
and-determine like procedure that completes the secret inner state recovery is provided.
Let 푅10푡 denote the least significant bit of register 푅1푡. To recover 푠4, 푠5, 푅10 and 푅20,
the following steps are applied:
- Pick a row from table 푇 as a guess for (9).
- Determine 푠4 from 푠4 = 훼(훼푠1)⊕ 훼(푠10 ⊕ 푠11) which holds due to (1) since 푠1, 푠10
and 푠11 are known.
- Guess 푅10 by fixing the register to one of the 232 possible values.
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- Determine:
- 푅20, from 푓0 = (푅10 ⊞ 푠9)⊕푅20
- 푅21, from 푅21 = 푇푟푎푛푠(푅10)
- 푅11, from 푅11 = 푅20⊞ (푠2⊕푅100 ⋅ 푠9), which is another way to formulate (2)
- 푅22, from 푅22 = 푇푟푎푛푠(푅11)
- 푅12, from 푅12 = 푅21 ⊞ (푠3 ⊕푅101 ⋅ 푠10), which follows from (2)
- 푅23, from 푅23 = 푇푟푎푛푠(푅12)
- 푅13, from 푅13 = 푅22 ⊞ (푠4 ⊕푅102 ⋅ 푠11), which follows from (2)
- 푠12, from 푓3 = (푅13 ⊞ 푠12)⊕푅23
- 푠5, from 푠12 = 푠11 ⊕ 훼−1푠5 ⊕ 훼푠2
With a guess for (9) from the first step of the procedure above and having recovered 푠4,
푠5, 푅10 and 푅20, the only left unknown inner state registers are 푠6 and 푠7. To recover the
remaining two registers, the table of 232 candidates for (푠4, 푠5, 푠6, 푠7) obtained in section
3.4.2 is matched with newly found value for 푠4, 푠5, as follows. Consider the s-box input-
output in the second iteration of SOSEMANUK, for which the input-output has not been
recovered uniquely. For some 0 ≤ 푖 ≤ 31, 푓 푖7∣푓 푖6∣푓 푖5∣푓 푖4 and consequently, 푆(푓 푖7∣푓 푖6∣푓 푖5∣푓 푖4)
can take 4 values as specified by Table 1. More precisely, rewriting (5) while isolating 푖-th
s-box
푧푖7∣푧푖6∣푧푖5∣푧푖4 = 푆(푓 푖7∣푓 푖6∣푓 푖5∣푓 푖4)⊕ 푠푖7∣푠푖6∣푠푖5∣푠푖4, (12)
we have two options regarding the possible candidates. In other words, from the last two
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rows of Table 1, we have either
푆(푓 푖7∣푓 푖6∣푓 푖5∣푓 푖4) ∈ {0110, 1100, 0001, 1011} (13)
or
푆(푓 푖7∣푓 푖6∣푓 푖5∣푓 푖4) ∈ {1001, 1111, 0100, 0010}. (14)
Moreover, according to the procedure given in this subsection, the value of bits 푠푖4, 푠
푖
5
has been determined uniquely. Since 푠푖4 and 푠
푖
5 are known, according to (12), the two
least significant bits of 푆(푓 푖7∣푓 푖6∣푓 푖5∣푓 푖4) can be determined uniquely. Finally, due to the
structure of sets (13) or (14), given information on the two least significant bits, all the 4
bits of 푆(푓 푖7∣푓 푖6∣푓 푖5∣푓 푖4) are uniquely determined. Presented reasoning uniquely determines
the input-output for every s-box, from which, according to (12), 푠7 and 푠6 are determined
uniquely, which completes the recovery of the whole secret inner state.
Now, the found secret inner state can be verified by comparing the actual SOSEMANUK
output with the output produced by the recovered inner state. If a difference registered, the
next guess for (9) and 푅10 is made and the procedure is repeated.
3.6 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, a differential fault analysis attack on SOSEMANUK was presented. The
overall attack complexity can be summarized as follows:
- The average number of faults required to perform the attack is 4 × 1536 = 6144.
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These 1536 transient faults are introduced in steps 푡 = 0, 푡 = 1, 푡 = 2 and 푡 = 4.
This fault injection phase requires the attacker to reinitialize the cipher for 6144 times
- The number of operations required for the attack is dominated by the guess-and-
determine part of the analysis. Namely, as concluded in section 3.4.3, table 푇 has
216 rows and thus there exists 216 possible guesses for (9). Since register 푅10 is
a 32-bit value, the number of guesses that need to be checked is 216 × 232 = 248.
Verifying each guess according to the procedure in section 3.5 is equivalent to one
SOSEMANUK iteration and thus the attack requires work equivalent to around 248
iterations.
- The storage amount required for the attack is equal to the size of the tables 푇1, 푇3
and 푇 which amounts to 238.17 bytes.
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Chapter 4
Differential Fault Analysis of
Hummingbird
4.1 Introduction
Hummingbird [13, 17] is an encryption algorithm designed for lightweight software and
lightweight hardware implementations on resource-constrained devices such as RFID tags
and wireless sensor nodes. Its design was inspired by the Enigma machine which led to a
hybrid combination of block cipher and stream cipher structures.
The security of Hummingbird was evaluated by its designers who concluded that the
the cipher is resistant to most common attacks against block ciphers and stream ciphers
including birthday attacks, differential and linear cryptanalysis, structure attacks, algebraic
attacks, and cube attacks. Also a chosen-IV and chosen-message attack was reported by
Saarinen [85].
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In this chapter, we present a differential fault analysis attack on Hummingbird. The
fault model in which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is assumed to
inject a transient fault at a random 4 bit word before the linear transformation, after the
4 × 4 s-boxes, of the four block ciphers which are used in the Hummingbird encryption
process but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. We also assume that the
attacker is able to reset the cipher an arbitrary number of times.
The main idea of our attack is inspired by recent differential fault analysis attacks
against the AES. In these attacks, the attacker collects few differential pairs relative to
the last non-linear step which allows the attacker to reduce and finally guess the values
computed in the last rounds and infer the last round key. However, unlike the AES case in
which once the round key has been recovered, the key schedule can be inverted to obtain
the initial secret key, this is not possible for Hummingbird since it does not have an explicit
invertible key schedule. Instead, the above procedure has to be reiterated on each round,
starting from the last one, until the whole key material is exposed. Our simulation results
showed that our attack, which recovers the 256-bit key, requires around 50 fault injections
and 266 steps.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. A brief description of the relevant details
of Hummingbird is provided in the next section. Our attack and its complexity analysis are
provided in section 4.3.
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4.2 Description of Hummingbird
The following notation and functions are used throughout the chapter:
⊞ : addition mod 216.
⊕ : bit-wise XOR.
∣∣ : Concatenation of the words.
<<< : left rotation defined on 16-bit value.
푆푖: the 푖푡ℎ 4-bit s-box where 푖 = 1, 2, 3, 4.
푆퐵푂푋: the 16-bit nonlinear function which equals to 푆1∣∣푆2∣∣푆3∣∣푆4.
푆퐵푂푋−1: the inverse mapping of 푆퐵푂푋 .
퐿(푥) : the 16-bit linear transform equation.
퐿−1(푥) : the inverse mapping of 퐿(푥).
△푋푖 : the 4-bit differential input of 푆푖.
△푌푖 : the 4-bit differential input of 푆푖.
As mentioned above, Hummingbird has a hybrid structure and consists of two main com-
ponents: a stream cipher and a block cipher. The input/output block size is 16-bit and the
internal state and key size are 80-bit and 256-bit, respectively.
Figure 4 depicts a top level view of the encryption process. The cipher algorithm con-
sists of four 16-bit block ciphers, 퐸푘푖(푖 = 1, 2, 3, 4), four 16-bit internal state registers
푅푆푖(푖 = 1, 2, 3, 4), and a 16-bit linear feedback shift register (LFSR). The original 256-bit
key is divided into four 64-bit subkeys 푘푖, 푖 = 1, 2, 3, 4, which are used in the four block
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Figure 4: An overview of the Hummingbird encryption process.
ciphers.
A 16-bit plaintext block 푃푇푖 is added to the first internal state register 푅푆1 modulo 216.
The result of the addition is then encrypted by the first block cipher 퐸푘1 . This procedure
is repeated in a similar manner for another three times and the output of 퐸푘4 is the corre-
sponding ciphertext, 퐶푇푖. At the same time, the states of the four internal state registers
will also be updated based on their current state values, the outputs of the first three block
ciphers, and the value of the LFSR. The decryption process follows a similar pattern as in
the encryption mode.
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In practice, Hummingbird is initialized with four 16-bit random nonces, 푁푂푁퐶퐸푖, 푖 =
0, 1, 2, 3, to construct the four internal state registers 푅푆푖, 푖 = 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively, fol-
lowed by applying the encryption algorithm to the message 푅푆1 ⊞ 푅푆3. The final 16-bit
ciphertext of the initialization is used to initialize the LFSR where the 13푡ℎ bit of the LFSR
is always set to 1.
The 16-bit block cipher is a typical substitution-permutation (SP) network with 16-bit
block size and 64-bit key. It consists of five rounds: four regular rounds and a final round
that only includes the key mixing and the s-box substitution steps. Each round comprises
of a key mixing step, a substitution layer, and a permutation layer. For the key mixing, a
simple xor operation is used. Figure 5 depicts the structure of the 16-bit block cipher and
the specification of the four s-boxes and linear transform mapping which are used in 퐸푘푖 .
The 64-bit subkey 푘푖 is divided into four 16-bit round keys 퐾
(푖)
푗 , 푗 = 1, 2, 3, 4, which
are used in the four regular rounds of SP structure, respectively. Moreover, two keys 퐾(푖)5
and 퐾(푖)6 which are directly derived from the four round keys are applied before and after
the last s-boxes.
Further details about the encryption, decryption and initialization processes can be
found in [13].
4.3 The proposed attack
The main idea of using differential fault analysis against Hummingbird is to recover the
whole secret keys based on determining round keys in four steps. In particular, we can
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retrieve 푘4 and peel off the last round function of the encryption process (퐸푘4) to determine
푉 34푡⊞푅푆4푡. Detailed explanation of how to recover the keys of the 퐸푘푖 step is provided in
the next subsection. By guessing all the 216 values of 푅푆4푡 and applying the same method
for determining the keys of the 16-bit block cipher (퐸푘3), 푘3 can be revealed. Similarly, the
values of 푘2 and 푘1 can be determined by applying the same procedure and guessing 푅푆3푡
and 푅푆2푡. Finally, by guessing 푅푆2푡, 푅푆3푡 and 푅푆4푡 we can determine 248 candidates
for 푘1, 푘2, 푘3 and 푘4. The correct key can then be uniquely determined using additional
plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
4.3.1 Key recovery of 퐸푘푖
In this section, we describe a differential fault analysis on the 퐸푘푖 function which are used
in Hummingbird algorithm. The injected faults are assumed to occur in one 4-bit word
before the linear transform and after the 4× 4 s-boxes.
Consider one 4-bit word differences at the input of the linear layer 퐿(푥). We have
60 (= 15 × 4) possible such differences corresponding to 4 different possible locations
and 15 different possible values. Because of the linearity, the number of corresponding
possible differences at its output is also 60 but, while the input difference affected one 4-
bit word only, the output difference affects up to 12 bits because of the diffusion linear
transformation layer (See Table 4.3.1.) Note that the key addition does not change the set
of possible differences.
First we describe how we can recover the last round subkey 퐾(푖)6 . We follow the same
idea of the attack described in [69]. Algorithm 1 shows the details.
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Differential input = (△푋1△푋2△푋3△푋4)



















1440 0144 4014 4401
2880 0288 8028 8802
3CC0 03CC C03C CC03
4011 1401 1140 0114
5451 1545 5154 4515
6891 1689 9168 8916
7CD1 17CD D17C CD17
8022 2802 2280 0228
9462 2946 6294 4629
A8A2 2A8A A2A8 8A2A
BCE2 2BCE E2BC CE2B
C033 3C03 33C0 033C
D473 3D47 73D4 473D
E8B3 3E8B B3E8 8B3E
FCF3 3FCF F3FC CF3F
Table 2: Possible differential outputs of the linear transformation - The 풟’s list
(Differential output = (△푌1△ 푌2△ 푌3△ 푌4)
All values are in Hexadecimal)
Algorithm 1:
1. Compute the 60 possible differences at the output of linear transform (퐿(푥)), i.e. the
60 values of 퐿(푥), where 푥 = 푥1∣∣푥2∣∣푥3∣∣푥4 and only one of the 푥푖’s has a Hamming
weight not equal to zero. Store the obtained values in a list 풟.
2. Consider a plaintext 푃 , its corresponding ciphertext 퐶 and faulty ciphertext 퐶 ′.
3. Guess the value of the round key 퐾(푖)6 .
4. Compute the difference 푆퐵푂푋−1(퐶⊕퐾(푖)6 )⊕푆퐵푂푋−1(퐶 ′⊕퐾(푖)6 ). Check whether
it is in 풟. If yes, add the round key to the list ℒ of possible candidates.
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round 4 퐾(4)2 ⊕퐾(4)4
round 3 퐾(4)1 ⊕퐾(4)3퐸푘4 round 2 퐾(4)4 퐾(4)2 ,퐾(4)4





Guess all of 216 possibilities of 푅푆4푡 7−→ Get 푉 34푡
round 4 퐾(3)2 ⊕퐾(3)4
round 3 퐾(3)1 ⊕퐾(3)3퐸푘3 round 2 퐾(3)4 퐾(3)2 ,퐾(3)4





Guess all of 216 possibilities of 푅푆3푡 7−→ Get 푉 23푡
round 4 퐾(2)2 ⊕퐾(2)4
round 3 퐾(2)1 ⊕퐾(2)3퐸푘2 round 2 퐾(2)4 퐾(2)2 ,퐾(2)4





Guess all of 216 possibilities of 푅푆2푡 7−→ Get 푉 12푡
round 4 퐾(1)2 ⊕퐾(1)4
round 3 퐾(1)1 ⊕퐾(1)3퐸푘1 round 2 퐾(1)4 퐾(1)2 ,퐾(1)4





Table 3: Summary of the fault attack on Hummingbird
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5. Consider a new plaintext 푃 (with corresponding 퐶 and 퐶 ′) and go back to step 2.
This time, the round key guesses only go through the list ℒ of possible candidates. If
the difference computed at step 4 is not in 풟, remove the candidate from ℒ). Repeat
until there remains only one candidate in ℒ.
The complexity of the Algorithm 1 is around 216 since we have to search all of the
target key at the beginning of step 3 of the algorithm. After 퐾(푖)6 is uniquely determined,
the last round is peeled off, and the attack is repeated on the reduced cipher.
We can find the subkey 퐾(푖)5 by repeating the same algorithm which is used to recover
퐾
(푖)




5 )) where 퐶−1 = 푆퐵푂푋
−1(퐶⊕퐾(푖)6 ) and 퐶 ′−1 = 푆퐵푂푋−1(퐶 ′⊕퐾(푖)6 ). 퐾(푖)3 and 퐾(푖)4
are revealed in the same way. Finally, we determine the remaining subkeys of 퐾(푖)1 and
퐾
(푖)
2 by computing 퐾
(푖)
3 ⊕퐾(푖)5 and 퐾(푖)4 ⊕퐾(푖)6 , respectively.
The above attack was simulated for 10,000 times using different random values for the
16-bit input and 64-bit subkey of 푘푖 for 퐸푘푖 . Based on our simulations, our attack requires
an average of 12.51 fault injections to recover the whole subkeys, 푘푖, 푖 = 1, 2, 3, 4. The
recorded minimum and the largest number of required faults were 8 and 22, respectively.
Table 4.3.1 summarizes the whole steps of the attack to recover the 256-bit secret key.
After the keys are recovered, we can then find the other internal registers by applying
the initialization process since the values of 푁푂푁퐶퐸푖(푖 = 0, 1, 2, 3) are public.
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4.3.2 The complexity of our attack
To recover all of the 256-bit secret key we have to apply the above fault attack for four
times and guess all candidate values of the three internal registers: 푅푆2푡, 푅푆3푡 and 푅푆4푡.
From our experimental results, we need around 12.5 faulty values to uniquely determine
each subround key. Thus, our attack requires 50 faulty ciphertext, 248 guessing of 16-bit
values and calling Algorithm 1 (with complexity 216) in each step to reveal the subkeys.
Since we have to use four times of the Algorithm 1 in each step of 퐸푘푖 , the total complexity
of our attack is about 4× 216 × 248 = 266.
4.4 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we presented a fault attack against a newly introduced ultra lightweight
encryption algorithm, Hummingbird. Each 64-bit round key can be found, on average,
using 12.51 faulty encryptions. If we assume that the 256-bit secret key and 80-bit internal
state have random distribution, then the whole cipher can be broken after around 50 faults.
To fully recover the key, we have to guess 248 values of three 16-bit internal state registers
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      Four S-boxes which used in the block cipher in Hummingbird  
(in hexadecimal notation) 
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Linear Transform (L) : {0,1}
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Scan Based Side Channel Attack on
ZUC
5.1 Introduction
Recently, a new set of cryptographic algorithms was proposed by the Data Assurance and
Communication Security (DACAS) research center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
[14, 15] for inclusion in the 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) mobile standard. The core
of the new LTE cryptographic algorithms consist of an encryption algorithm, called 128-
EEA3, and an integrity algorithm, called 128-EIA3.
The ZUC algorithm [86, 87] is the core of the proposed confidentiality and integrity
algorithms. ZUC is a word-oriented stream cipher that generates a key stream of 32-bit
words based on two stages of execution. It uses a 128-bit key and a 128-bit initial vec-
tor (iv) as input. The two execution stages of ZUC are the key initialization stage and
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the working stage. In the first stage, a key initialization is performed, i.e., the cipher is
clocked without producing any output. In the second stage, a 32-bit word of output is
produced with every round. Preliminary evaluation of the ZUC algorithm, conducted by
the algorithm standardization group ETSI SAGE, concluded that it is a strong and suitable
candidate for the LTE. Some other evaluations were also presented in the first international
workshop on ZUC algorithm [88]. Generally, all of these security evaluations considered
only the potential theoretical weaknesses of the algorithm. On the other hand, hardware
implementations [89] of cryptographic algorithm are used in many applications in order
to achieve the growing requirements for high throughout. Thus, hardware implementation
related attacks have to be considered.
In this chapter, we present a scan-based attack on ZUC. A scan path connects registers
in a circuit serially so that a tester can observe the register values inside the circuit. The
scan path is widely used in recent circuit implementations due to its ease of implementation
and high test coverage [90]. Scan-based attacks exploit the scan chains that are inserted into
the devices for the purpose of testing. Scan based attacks have been demonstrated on block
ciphers such as DES [73] and AES [91], stream ciphers [74, 75] and public keys such as
elliptic curve cryptosystems [90]. Our scan based attack on ZUC allows us to uniquely
determine the corresponding locations of the inner state variables (the LFSR registers and
the memory cells) in the output scan chain and consequently recover the secret initial state.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief
overview of scan based analysis attacks. In section 5.3, relevant details of ZUC are re-
viewed. Details of the attack are described in section 5.4. Finally, the conclusion is given
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in section 5.5.
5.2 General description of the attack
Scan chain based attacks can be considered as a class of side channel attacks that targets
the design for testability feature of modern hardware circuity. This design for testability
is a design technique in which scan chains are kept with the objective to test designs by
providing a simple way to set and observe every flip flop in the hardware circuit. A special
signal, scan enable, is added to the design. When this scan enable signal is set, every
flip flip of the tested circuit is connected as a chain of registers. The data to this chain is
provided through one input pin and the scan output is provided through another output pin.
An input pattern can be scanned into the registers on each clock event. Then after a normal
run of the circuit, the scan chain content can be scanned out for testing.
In 2004, Yang et al. [73] introduced the notion of scan based attacks against dedicated
hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms and described the details of these
attacks against DES. This class of attacks was extended to AES in [91] and [92]. Besides,
a scan-based attack against ECC was proposed in [90]. Scan based attacks against stream
ciphers were introduced by Agrawal et al [74], where a detailed attack against Trivium was
described. Liu et al in [75] presented scan based attacks against other LFSR-based stream
ciphers where this technique was applied on the six such stream ciphers including DECIM,
Pomaranch, A5/1, A5/2, w7 and LILI II.
Scan based attacks have two phases [74]: ascertaining the internal structure of the scan
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chain and deciphering the cryptosystem by revealing the secret internal data. Throughout
our analysis, we assume that:
∙ The attacker knows the details of the cipher algorithm.
∙ The attacker has access to high level timing diagram of the hardware implementation.
∙ The secret key is stored in a secure memory and is not part of the scan chain.
∙ The attacker does not know the structure of the scan chain.
∙ The device under attack can be run for any prespecified number of clock cycles cho-
sen by the attacker.
∙ The attacker can scan out the states of internal registers of the device after any pre-
specified number of clock cycles.
∙ The attacker can scan in chosen vectors and apply chosen inputs to the device under
attack.
For our analysis, we assume a straightforward hardware implementation of ZUC that
does not imply any pipelining optimization. We consider an implementation in which both
stages of ZUC, the initialization stage and the working stage, are performed in hardware.
Furthermore, we assume that the key loading procedure (see section 5.3) is performed off
line and then its result is loaded into the LFSR. In this scenario, the hardware associated
with the internal state of ZUC would consists of 496 bits for the LFSR and 64 bits for 푅1
and 푅2. In other words, the scan chain for ZUC will have a total of 560 bits.
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5.3 The ZUC specifications
ZUC is a word-oriented stream cipher which takes a 128-bit initial key and a 128-bit initial
vector (iv) as input and generates a 32-bit word as an output in every clock cycle. This
key stream can be used to encrypt the plaintext. ZUC utilizes three main components to
generate the keystream output: a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), bit-reorganization
(BR) and non-linear function (퐹 ).
The following notation, mostly from [14, 15], will be used throughout the rest of this
chapter:
- ⊞ : The addition modulo 232.
- ⊕ : The bit-wise XOR.
- ∨ : The bit-wise OR.
- ∧ : The bit-wise AND.
- 푋 : The bit-wise complement of an 푛-bit word 푋 .
- ∣∣ : Concatenation.
- mod : The modulo operation of integers.
- (푎1, 푎2, . . . , 푎푛) −→ (푏1, 푏2, . . . , 푏푛) : The assignment of the values of 푎푖 to 푏푖 in
parallel.
- 푎퐻 : The leftmost 16 bits of integer a.
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- 푎퐿 : The rightmost 16 bits of integer a.
- 푎 <<<푛 푘 : The k-bit cyclic shift of the n-bit register a to the left.
- 푎 >> 1 : The l-bit right shift of integer a.
- 푋푗푖 : The 푗-th bit of an 푛-bit word 푋푖.





푖 : The 푗-th bit of an 푛-bit word 푋푖 has been set to 1 but its corresponding location





푖 : The location, in the scan chain output, of the 푗-th bit of an 푛-bit word 푋푖 has
been determined uniquely.
Figure 6 shows the three dependent layers of ZUC. The secret inner state of ZUC con-
sists of the LFSR and the F function layers which have sixteen 31-bit words (푠0, . . . , 푠15)
and 2 32-bit words (푅1, 푅2), respectively. The LFSR has two modes of operations: the
initialization mode and the working mode.
According to the new version of the ZUC specifications [15], the first mode works as
follows:
LFSR With Initialization Mode (u) {
1. 푣 = 215푠15 + 217푠13 + 221푠10 + 220푠4 + (1 + 28)푠0 mod (231 − 1);
2. 푠16 = (푣 + 푢) mod (231 − 1);
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Figure 6: Overview of the ZUC stream cipher
4. (푠1, 푠2, . . . , 푠15, 푠16) −→ (푠0, 푠1, . . . , 푠14, 푠15).}
In the working mode, the LFSR does not receive any input, and it updates its current
state as follows:
LFSR With Work Mode() {
1. 푠16 = 215푠15 + 217푠13 + 221푠10 + 220푠4 + (1 + 28)푠0 mod (231 − 1);
2. If 푠16 = 0, then set 푠16 = 231 − 1;
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3. (푠1, 푠2, . . . , 푠15, 푠16) −→ (푠0, 푠1, . . . , 푠14, 푠15).}
The bit-reorganization layer extracts 128 bits from 8 registers of the LFSR and forms 4
32-bit words as follows:
Bit reorganization() {
1. 푋0 = 푠15퐻 ∣∣푠14퐿;
2. 푋1 = 푠11퐿∣∣푠9퐻 ;
3. 푋2 = 푠7퐿∣∣푠5퐻 ;
4. 푋3 = 푠2퐿∣∣푠0퐻 .}
The nonlinear function 퐹 consists of two 32-bit words 푅1 and 푅2 as memory cells. 퐹
takes 푋0, 푋1 and 푋2 as it’s inputs, which are the outputs of the bit-reorganization layer,
then outputs a 32-bit word 푊 as follows:
F(푋0, 푋1, 푋2) {
1. 푊 = (푋0 ⊕푅1)⊞푅2;
2. 푊1 = 푅1 ⊞푋1;
3. 푊2 = 푅2 ⊕푋2;
4. 푅1 = 푆(퐿1(푊1퐿∣∣푊2퐻));
5. 푅2 = 푆(퐿2(푊2퐿∣∣푊1퐻)).}
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where 푆 is a 32×32 s-box, 퐿1 and 퐿2 are linear transformation. The s-box is composed
by 4 juxtaposed 8 × 8 s-boxes, i.e., 푆 = (푆0, 푆1, 푆0, 푆1). The lookup table definition of
these s-boxes can be found in [15]. 퐿1 and 퐿2 are linear mapping from 32-bit words to
32-bit words, and are defined as follows:
퐿1(푋) = 푋 ⊕ (푋 <<<32 2)⊕ (푋 <<<32 10)⊕ (푋 <<<32 18)⊕ (푋 <<<32 24)
퐿2(푋) = 푋 ⊕ (푋 <<<32 8)⊕ (푋 <<<32 14)⊕ (푋 <<<32 22)⊕ (푋 <<<32 30)
The execution of ZUC has two stages: key initialization stage and working stage. The
algorithm first calls the key loading procedure to load the key and the 푖푣 into the LFSR as
the initial state and set 푅1 and 푅2 to all 0’s.
The key loading procedure works as follows:
Key loading {
1. Let 퐷 be a 240 bit constant value by
퐷 = 푑0∣∣푑1∣∣ . . . ∣∣푑15
2. For 푖 = 0 . . . 15, let 푠푖 = 푘푖∣∣푑푖∣∣푖푣푖.}
where 푑푖 are 16 15-bit constant values, 푘푖 and 푖푣푖, 푖 = 0 . . . 15 are all bytes of the 128-bit
initial key 푘 and the 128-bit initial vector 푖푣 respectively. Then the cipher runs the follow-
ing operation 32 times to finish the key initialization stage.
The initialization stage {
1. Bit reorganization();
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2. 푤 = 퐹 (푋0, 푋1, 푋2);
3. LFSR With Initialization Mode(푤 >> 1).}
After the initialization stage and the first iteration of the working stage, in which the
output 푊 of 퐹 is discarded, the algorithm goes into the stage of generation key stream. For
each iteration, the following operations are done once and a 32-bit word 푍 is produced as
an output:
The working stage {
1. Bit reorganization();
2. 푍 = 퐹 (푋0, 푋1, 푋2)⊕푋3;
3. LFSR With Work Mode(). }
5.4 The proposed attack
5.4.1 Overview
Our proposed attack is applicable to scenarios where the attacker has access to the encryp-
tion hardware device after the key loading process and the initialization stage have been
executed. The proposed scan based attack allows the attacker to recover the internal state
of the cipher, but not the key, since we assume that the key bits are stored in a secure mem-
ory and cannot be scanned out. According to our scan based analysis model, the attacker is
also assumed to be able to re-initialize the encryption device an arbitrary number of times
and obtain the values of the states of internal registers of the device after each clock cycle.
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The attack can be divided into two phases. The first phase uses the key loading proce-
dure to determine correspondence between the individual bits in the scan chain output and
the 푠푖 bits that are loaded with the 128-bit initial key k and the 128-bit initial vector iv in
step 2 of the key initialization stage.
In the second phase (explained in sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4), the attacker determines the
remaining structure of the scan chain, i.e., the attacker determines the exact location of the
remaining internal state registers including the remaining bits of the LFSR and the memory
cells 푅1 and 푅2.
5.4.2 Key loading stage
The scan out bits corresponding to the 256 bits of the LFSR register that are loaded with
the 128-bit initial key k and the 128-bit initial vector iv in step 2 of the key initialization
stage can be determined by the key loading procedure as follows:
For 푙 = 0 . . . 127:
1 Set iv=0 and 푘 = 2푙.
2 Load the k and the iv.
3 Determine the location corresponding to the 푙푡ℎ bit in 푘 (which is set to 1) in the
푠푐푎푛푛푒푑− 표푢푡.
4 Use 푠푐푎푛푛푒푑− 푖푛 with the information of step 2 to determine the correspondence
in the 푠푐푎푛푛푒푑− 푖푛 position.
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The above procedure recovers the positions, in the scan out chain, corresponding to the
most significant bytes of the LFSR. Recovering the position of the least significant bytes



































for i=0. . . 15.
5.4.3 Determining the locations of the remaining LFSR bits
In what follows, we show how to determine the remaining 16 × 15 = 240 bit position of
the LFSR (which are loaded by the 푑푖 values in the key loading procedure). We also show







First, we initialize the LFSR register, 푅1 and 푅2 with all 0’s and then run the system for
1 clock cycle to determine some specific positions. Then, we reset the circuit and scan in a
specific input pattern with a Hamming weight equals "1". Finally we run the system for a
prespecified number of clock cycles to load the above pattern and then perform a scan out
operation. As shown below, examining the output pattern in the scan chain output allows
us to determine the required bit positions.
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1. Determining the bit locations of 푆15:
(a) Set 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 1 clock cycle
we have:
∙ 푋0 = 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(1)=0x3E553E55 and 푅2(1)=0x3E553E55.
∙ 푆16 = 231 − 1.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆15) = (0, 0, . . .,0,0x7FFFFFFF).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x3E553E55,0x3E553E55).
Thus all the activated bits, i.e., the bits that are set to "1" in the above process,
belong to 푆15, 푅1 and 푅2.
(b) For 푖 = 0 . . . 7: set 푆0(0) = 2푖, 푆1(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) =
0. Then after 1 clock cycle we have:
∙ 푋0 = 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(1)=0x3E553E55 and 푅2(1)=0x3E553E55.
∙ 푆16 = 2푖 + 2푖+8.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆15) = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 2푖 + 2푖+8).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x3E553E55,0x3E553E55).
The values of 푅1 and 푅2 remain the same as in step 1a. On the other hand,
two bits of 푆15 will change which allows us to determine the position of the
(푖 + 9)푡ℎ, 푖 = 0 . . . 7, bit in 푆15 which corresponds to 2푖+8 in the equations
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(c) For 푖 = 0 . . . 5: set 푆13(0) = 2푖, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆12(0) = 푆14(0) = 푆15(0)=0
and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 1 clock cycle we have:
∙ 푋0 = 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(1)=0x3E553E55 and 푅2(1)=0x3E553E55.
∙ 푆16 = 2푖+17.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆15) = (0, 0, . . . , 2푖, 0, 0, 2푖+17).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x3E553E55,0x3E553E55).
Again, the positions of activated bits in 푅1 and 푅2 do not change from step 1a.
However the (푖+18)푡ℎ, 푖 = 0 . . . 5, bit of 푆15, which corresponds to 2푖+17 in the
equations above, will change which allows us to determine the exact positions
of these bits. Finally, the position of the remaining bit 푆1715 , can be found from
the fact that all positions of 푆15 are already determined during step 1a. Thus at





























2. Determining the bit locations of 푆14:
(a) Set 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 2 clock cycles
72
we have:
∙ 푋0 = 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(2)=0x38A538A5 and 푅2(2)=0x34813481.
∙ 푆16 = 231 − 1.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆15) = (0, 0, . . .,0,0x7FFFFFFF,0x7FFFFFFF).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x38A538A5,0x34813481).
Thus all the activated bits, i.e., the bits that are set to "1" in the above process,
belong to 푆14, 푆15, 푅1 and 푅2.
(b) For 푖 = 0 . . . 7: set 푆0(0) = 2푖, 푆1(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) =
0. Then after 2 clock cycles we have:
∙ 푋0 = 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(2)=0x38A538A5 and 푅2(2)=0x34813481.
∙ 푆16 = 215+푖 + 223+푖.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆15) = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 2푖 + 2푖+8, 215+푖 + 223+푖).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x38A538A5,0x34813481).
The values of 푅1 and 푅2 remain the same as in step 2a. On the other hand,
two bits of 푆14 will change which allows us to determine the position of the
(푖 + 9)푡ℎ, 푖 = 0 . . . 7, bit in 푆14 which corresponds to 2푖+8 in the equations


































(c) For 푖 = 1 . . . 7: set 푆15(0) = 2푖, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆14(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) =
0. Then after 2 clock cycles we have:
∙ 푋0 ∕= 0, 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(2)=0x38A538A5 and 푅2(2)=0x34813481.
∙ 푆16 = 2푖+17.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆14) = (0, 0, . . . , 2푖, 2푖+15).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x38A538A5,0x34813481).
Again, the positions of activated bits in 푅1 and 푅2 do not change from step 2a.
However the (푖+16)푡ℎ, 푖 = 1 . . . 7, bit of 푆14, which corresponds to 2푖+15 in the
equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions





























3. Determining the bit locations of 푆13:
(a) Set 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 3 clock cycles
we have:
∙ 푋0 =0xFFFFFFFF,푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(3)=0x5334B0EC and 푅2(3)=0xFE03AA92.
∙ 푆16 = 231 − 1.




Thus all the activated bits, i.e. the bits that are set to "1" in the above process,
belong to 푆13, 푆14, 푆15, 푅1 and 푅2.
(b) For 푖 = 0 . . . 7: set 푆0(0) = 2푖, 푆1(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) =
0. Then after 3 clock cycles we have:
∙ 푋0 ∕= 0, 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(3)=0x5334B0EC and 푅2(3)=0xFE03AA92.
∙ 푆16 = 215+푖 + 223+푖.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆13) = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 2푖 + 2푖+8).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x5334B0EC,0xFE03AA92).
The values of 푅1 and 푅2 remain the same as in step 3a. On the other hand,
two bits of 푆13 are changed during the clocks which allows us to determine the
position of the (푖+ 9)푡ℎ, 푖 = 0 . . . 7, bit in 푆13 which corresponds to 2푖+8 in the

































(c) For 푖 = 1 . . . 7: set 푆15(0) = 2푖, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆14(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) =
0. Then after 3 clock cycles we have:
∙ 푋0 ∕= 0, 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
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∙ 푅1(3)=0x5334B0EC and 푅2(3)=0xFE03AA92.
∙ 푆16 = 2푖+17.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆13) = (0, 0, . . . , 2푖, 2푖+15).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x5334B0EC,0xFE03AA92).
Again, the positions of activated bits in 푅1 and 푅2 do not change from step 3a.
However the (푖+16)푡ℎ, 푖 = 1 . . . 7, bit of 푆13, which corresponds to 2푖+15 in the
equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions





























4. Determining the bit locations of 푆12:
(a) Set 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 4 clock cycles
we have:
∙ 푋0 =0xFFFFFFFF,푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(4)=0x39A8912E and 푅2(4)=0x14AE6F5C.
∙ 푆16 = 231 − 1.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆15) = (0, 0, . . .,0,0x7FFFFFFF,0x7FFFFFFF,
0x7FFFFFFF,0x7FFFFFFF).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x39A8912E,0x14AE6F5C).
Thus all the activated bits, i.e. the bits that are set to "1" in the above process,
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belong to 푆12, 푆13, 푆14, 푆15, 푅1 and 푅2.
(b) For 푖 = 0 . . . 7: set 푆0(0) = 2푖, 푆1(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) =
0. Then after 4 clock cycles we have:
∙ 푋0 ∕= 0, 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(4)=0x39A8912E and 푅2(4)=0x14AE6F5C.
∙ 푆16 = 215+푖 + 223+푖.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆12) = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 2푖 + 2푖+8).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x39A8912E,0x14AE6F5C).
The values of 푅1 and 푅2 remain the same as in step 4a. On the other hand,
two bits of 푆12 are changed during the clocks which allows us to determine the
position of the (푖+ 9)푡ℎ, 푖 = 0 . . . 7, bit in 푆12 which corresponds to 2푖+8 in the

































(c) For 푖 = 1 . . . 7: set 푆15(0) = 2푖, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆14(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) =
0. Then after 4 clock cycles we have:
∙ 푋0 ∕= 0, 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(4)=0x39A8912E and 푅2(4)=0x14AE6F5C.
∙ 푆16 = 2푖+17.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆12) = (0, 0, . . . , 2푖, 2푖+15).
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∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x39A8912E,0x14AE6F5C).
Again, the positions of activated bits in 푅1 and 푅2 do not change from step 4a.
However the (푖+16)푡ℎ, 푖 = 1 . . . 7, bit of 푆12, which corresponds to 2푖+15 in the
equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions





























5. Determining the bit locations of 푆11 and 푅221 :
(a) Set 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 5 clock cycles
we have:
∙ 푋0 =0xFFFFFFFF,푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(5)=0xBF289712 and 푅2(5)=0x21513161.
∙ 푆16 = 231 − 1.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆15) = (0, 0, . . .,0,0x7FFFFFFF,0x7FFFFFFF,
0x7FFFFFFF,0x7FFFFFFF,0x7FFFFFFF).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0xBF289712,0x21513161).
Thus all the activated bits, i.e., the bits that are set to "1" in the above process,
belong to 푆11, 푆12, 푆13, 푆14, 푆15, 푅1 and 푅2. At the end of this step, the 22푡ℎ bit





(b) For 푖 = 0 . . . 7: set 푆0(0) = 2푖, 푆1(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) =
0. Then after 5 clock cycles we have:
∙ 푋0 ∕= 0, 푋1 = 푋2 = 푋3 = 0.
∙ 푅1(5)=0xBF289712 and 푅2(5)=0x21513161.
∙ 푆16 = 215+푖 + 223+푖.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆11) = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 2푖 + 2푖+8).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0xBF289712,0x21513161).
The values of 푅1 and 푅2 remain the same as in step 5a. On the other hand,
two bits of 푆11 are changed during the clocks which allows us to determine the
position of the (푖+ 9)푡ℎ, 푖 = 0 . . . 7, bit in 푆11 which corresponds to 2푖+8 in the

































(c) For 푖 = 16 . . . 22: set 푆12(0) = 2푖, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆11(0) = 푆13(0) = 푆14(0) =
푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 1 clock cycle we have:
∙ 푋1 = 푋2 = 0.
∙ 푅1(1) = 푅2(1)=0x3E553E55.
∙ 푆16 = 231 − 1.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆15) = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 2푖, 0, 0, 0, 231 − 1).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x3E553E55,0x3E553E55).
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Again, the positions of activated bits in 푅1 and 푅2 do not change from step 1a.
However, the (푖 + 1)푡ℎ, 푖 = 16 . . . 22, bit of 푆11, which corresponds to 2푖 in the
equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions





























6. Determining the bit locations of 푆10 and 푅322 :
(a) For 푖 = 8 . . . 22: set 푆11(0) = 2푖, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆10(0) = 푆12(0) = . . . =
푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 1 clock cycle we have:
∙ 푋1 = 2푖+16, and 푋2 = 0.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆10) = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 2푖).
∙ 푅1(1)=0x3E553E55 and 푅2(1) ∕= 0 (For the first 8 values of i, 푖 = 8 . . . 15)
– 푖 = 8, 푅2(1)=0x762072DD =⇒
✓
푆910





– 푖 = 10, 푅2(1)=0x723BE0C2 =⇒
✓
푆1110
– 푖 = 11, 푅2(1)=0x5B9F5463 =⇒
✓
푆1210




푅322 , the position of 푅
32
2
















– 푖 = 14, 푅2(1)=0x7BDDE38C =⇒
✓
푆1510
– 푖 = 15, 푅2(1)=0x4DADBC44 =⇒
✓
푆1610
∙ 푅1(1) = 푅2(1) =0x3E553E55 (For the last 7 values of 푖, 푖 = 16 . . . 22).
Again, the positions of activated bits in 푅1 and 푅2 do not change from step
1a. However the (푖+1)푡ℎ, 푖 = 16 . . . 22, bit of 푆10, which corresponds to 2푖
in the equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact





























Finally, we can find all unknown positions of 푆10 and the most significant bit
place of 푅2 at the end of this step.
7. Determining the bit locations of 푆9:
(a) For 푖 = 8 . . . 22: set 푆10(0) = 2푖, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆9(0) = 푆11(0) = . . . =
푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 1 clock cycle we have:
∙ 푋1 = 푋2 = 0.
∙ 푅1(1) = 푅2(1)=0x3E553E55.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆9) = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 2푖).
∙ (푅1, 푅2)=(0x3E553E55,0x3E553E55).
Again, the positions of activated bits in 푅1 and 푅2 do not change from step 1a.
However the (푖 + 1)푡ℎ, 푖 = 8 . . . 22, bit of 푆9, which corresponds to 2푖 in the
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equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions









8. Determining the bit locations of 푆8, 푅151 and 푅181 :
(a) For 푖 = 8 . . . 22: set 푆9(0) = 2푖, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆8(0) = 푆10(0) = . . . =
푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 1 clock cycle we have:
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆8) = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 2푖).
∙ 푅1(1) = 푅2(1) =0x3E553E55 (For 푖 = 8 . . . 14).
The values of 푅1 and 푅2 remain the same as in step 1a. On the other hand,
two bits of 푆8 are changed during the clocks which allows us to determine
the position of the (푖+ 1)푡ℎ, 푖 = 8 . . . 14, bit in 푆8 which corresponds to 2푖





























∙ 푅2(1)=0x3E553E55 and 푅1(1) ∕= 0 (For 푖 = 15, 16, 17)
– 푋1 = 2푖−15, and 푋2 = 0.











푅181 . So, the other




푅151 ). Besides, the position of 푆
16
8 can be found easily after finding
the position of 푅151 as well (
✓










푅181 , two positions are ac-
tivated where 푅181 was just activated in the previous step. Then, 푅
18
1
can be determined (
✓
푅181 ). Finally, 푆
18
8 can be found easily after finding
the position of 푅181 (
✓
푆188 ).
∙ For the last 5 values of 푖 = 18 . . . 22, all positions of 푅1(1) and 푅2(1) are
already distinguishable based on their previous values. the (푖 + 1)푡ℎ, 푖 =
18 . . . 22, bit of 푆8, which corresponds to 2푖, is changed which allows us to






























Thus, at the end of this step we are able to find all unknown positions of 푆8 and
two bit locations of 푅1.
9. Determining the bit locations of 푆0 . . . 푆7:
(a) For 푗 = 8 . . . 1
For 푖 = 8 . . . 22, set:
푆푗(0) = 2
푖, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆푗−1(0) = 푆푗+1(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) =
푅2(0) = 0. Then after 1 clock cycle we have:
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∙ 푋1 = 0.
∙ (푆0, 푆1, . . . , 푆푗) = (0, 0, . . . , 2푖).
∙ 푅1(1) ∕= 0 and 푅2(1) ∕= 0. All of activated positions of 푅1 and 푅2 are
already distinguishable from the other registers based on their previous
values.
Again, the positions of activated bits in 푅1 and 푅2 do not change from previous
steps. However the (푖 + 1)푡ℎ, 푖 = 8 . . . 22, bit of 푆푗 ,푗 = 8 . . . 1, which corre-
sponds to 2푖 in the equations above, is changed which allows us to determine









5.4.4 Determining the location of the remaining bits in 푅1 and 푅2
In this section, we show how to determine the position of the remaining bits of the memory
cells. To achieve this, first we reset all registers to 0. Then, by examining the scan out chain
after clocking the circuit with a prespecified number of clock cycles, as shown below, we
are able to determine the position of these bits.
1. Determining the bit locations of 푅61, 푅231 , 푅261 , 푅281 , 푅311 and 푅72:
Set 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. During 5 clock cycles we
have:
(a) 푅1(1)= 0x3E553E55, 푅2(1)= 0x3E553E55.
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(b) 푅1(2)= 0x38A538A5, 푅2(2)= 0x34813481.
(c) 푅1(3)= 0x5334B0EC, 푅2(3)= 0x FE03AA92.
(d) 푅1(4)= 0x39A8912E, 푅2(4)= 0x14AE6F5C.
(e) 푅1(5)= 0xBF289712, 푅2(5)= 0x21513161.
The location of the "1" bit in
푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(4)[1푑] ∧ (푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(5)[1푒])
corresponds to the position of 푅61 where 푅1(2)[1푏] is the value of 푅1 in the 2
푛푑 clock
of the process 1b. In other words, the formula illustrates that the position of 푅61 can
be determined uniquely provided that this specific location must be "1" in steps 1푏, 1푐
and 1푑 and be "0" in steps 1푎 and 1푒 respectively. Similarly, the other bits can be
located as presented in Table 4.
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧ (푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(5)[1푒]) =⇒ 푅231
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧ (푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(4)[1푑]) =⇒ 푅261
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧ (푅1(3)[1푐]) =⇒ 푅281
푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧ (푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(4)[1푑]) =⇒ 푅311
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(5)[1푒] ∧ (푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐]) =⇒ 푅72
Table 4: Formulas used in step 1
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2. Determining the bit locations of푅241 , 푅12, 푅22, 푅122 , 푅132 , 푅172 , 푅242 , 푅252 , 푅262 , 푅292 and
푅302 :
Set 푆11(0) = 215, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆10(0) = 푆12(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and
푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after one clock cycle we have:
(a) 푅1(1)= 0x3E553E55, 푅2(1)= 0x4DADBC44.
The location of the "1" bit in
푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(4)[1푑] ∧ (푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(5)[1푒] ∨푅1(1)[2푎])
corresponds to the position of 푅241 and it can be determined uniquely.
Similarly, the location of the other bits can be determined as shown in Table 5.
3. Determining the bit locations of 푅11, 푅31, 푅41, 푅141 , 푅191 , 푅291 , 푅301 , 푅321 , 푅62, 푅112 , 푅182 ,
푅272 and 푅282 :
Set 푆9(0) = 215, 푆0(0) = . . . = 푆8(0) = 푆10(0) = . . . = 푆15(0)=0 and 푅1(0) =
푅2(0) = 0. Then after 1 clock cycle we have:
(a) 푅1(1)= 0xCAC8723B, 푅2(1)= 0x3E553E55.
The location of the "1" bit in
푅1(1)[1푎]∧푅1(2)[1푏]∧푅1(1)[2푎]∧푅1(1)[3푎]∧(푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(5)[1푒])
corresponds to the position of 푅11 and it can be determined uniquely.
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푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(2)[1푏] ∧푅2(5)[1푒] ∧ (푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(1)[2푎]) =⇒ 푅12
푅2(3)[1푐] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[2푎]) =⇒ 푅22
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(5)[1푒]) =⇒ 푅122
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(2)[1푏] ∧푅2(5)[1푒] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(4)[1푑]) =⇒ 푅132
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(2)[1푏] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(5)[1푒] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅2(4)[1푑]) =⇒ 푅172
푅2(2)[1푏] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(5)[1푒]) =⇒ 푅242
푅2(5)[1푒] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(4)[1푑]) =⇒ 푅252
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧ (푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[2푎]) =⇒ 푅262
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(2)[1푏] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧ (푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[2푎]) =⇒ 푅292
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(2)[1푏] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(5)[1푒] ∧ (푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(1)[2푎]) =⇒ 푅302
Table 5: Formulas used in step 2
Similarly, the location of the other bits can be determined as shown in Table 6.















2 and 푅312 :
Set 푆5 = 216 + 218 + 220 + 221=0x00350000, 푆9 = 216 + 220=0x00110000, 푆푗 =
0; {푗 = 0 . . . 15, 푗 ∕= 5, 9 } and 푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 1 clock cycle we
have:
(a) 푅1(1)= 0xCF571B36, 푅2(1)= 0xC92206F5.
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푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅1(5)[1푒]) ∨푅1(1)[3푎] =⇒ 푅31
푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(1)[3푎] ∧ (푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(5)[1푒] ∨푅1(1)[2푎]) =⇒ 푅41
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧푅1(1)[3푎] ∧ (푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(5)[1푒]) =⇒ 푅141
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧ (∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(5)[1푒] ∨푅1(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅191
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅1(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅291
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧ (∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(5)[1푒] ∨푅1(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅301
푅1(5)[1푎] ∧푅1(1)[3푎] ∧ (푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(1)[2푎]) =⇒ 푅321
푅2(5)[1푎] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(1)[2푎] ∨푅2(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅62
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(2)[1푏] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧푅2(1)[3푎] ∧ (푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(5)[1푒]) =⇒ 푅112
푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[2푎] ∨푅2(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅182
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(2)[1푏] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧푅2(1)[3푎] ∧ (푅2(5)[1푒]) =⇒ 푅272
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧푅2(1)[3푎] ∧ (푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(5)[1푒]) =⇒ 푅282
Table 6: Formulas used in step 3
The location of the "1" bit in
푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧푅1(1)[3푎] ∧푅1(1)[4푎]∧
(푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(1)[2푎])
corresponds to the position of 푅21 and it can be determined uniquely. Similarly, the
other bits can be located as depicted in Table 7.
5. Determining the bit locations of 푅51, 푅101 , 푅121 , 푅171 , 푅42, 푅52, 푅102 , 푅152 , 푅212 and 푅232 :
Set 푆5=0x011700000, 푆9=0x01110000, 푆푗 = 0; {푗 = 0 . . . 15, 푗 ∕= 5, 9 } and
푅1(0) = 푅2(0) = 0. Then after 1 clock cycle we have:
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(a) 푅1(1)= 0x7D9C9DDD, 푅2(1)=0x9E4C22CB.
Table 8 shows how the remaining bits can be located.
Note that the computations performed in this section can be performed simultaneously,
i.e., in parallel, by observing the scan out results in section 5.4.3. In other words, these
steps do not require any extra clocking for the circuit.
5.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we presented a scan based side channel attack on ZUC. Our attack allows
the cryptanalyst to determine the bit positions corresponding to the cipher secret internal
state in the scan out chain. To do so, we first used the key loading procedure to determine
the least and the most significant byte locations of the LFSR register. Then we utilized the
working mode procedure to determine the positions corresponding to the remaining bits in
the LFSR and the memory cells 푅1 and 푅2.
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푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(5)[1푒] ∨푅1(1)[3푎] ∨푅1(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅71
푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(3)[1푐] ∧ (푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(5)[1푒] ∨푅1(1)[2푎] ∨푅1(1)[3푎] ∨푅1(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅81
푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧푅1(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(1)[2푎] ∨푅1(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅91
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(1)[3푎] ∨푅1(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅111
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧푅1(1)[3푎] ∧푅1(1)[4푎] =⇒ 푅131
푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧ (푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(1)[2푎] ∨푅1(1)[3푎] ∨푅1(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅161
푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧푅1(1)[3푎] ∧ (푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(1)[2푎] ∨푅1(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅201
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧푅1(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(5)[1푒] ∨푅1(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅211
푅1(3)[1푐] ∧푅1(4)[1푑] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧푅1(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅1(1)[1푎] ∨푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(1)[2푎] ∨푅1(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅251
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧푅1(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅271
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧푅2(1)[3푎] ∧푅2(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(5)[1푒]) =⇒ 푅32
푅2(2)[1푏] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[2푎] ∨푅2(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅82
푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(5)[1푒] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(1)[2푎] ∨푅2(1)[3푎] ∨푅2(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅92
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(2)[1푏] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(5)[1푒] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧푅2(1)[3푎] ∧푅2(1)[4푎] =⇒ 푅142
푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[3푎] ∨푅2(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅162
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧푅2(1)[3푎] ∧ (푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅192
푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[3푎] ∨푅2(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅202
푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧푅2(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅222
푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(1)[2푎] ∧푅2(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[3푎]) =⇒ 푅312
Table 7: Formulas used in step 4
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푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧푅1(1)[3푎] ∧푅1(1)[4푎] ∧푅1(1)[5푎] ∧ (푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(4)[1푑]) =⇒ 푅51
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(5)[1푒] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧푅1(1)[3푎] ∧푅1(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅1(2)[1푏] ∨푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(1)[5푎]) =⇒ 푅101
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧푅1(1)[4푎] ∧푅1(1)[5푎] ∧ (푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(5)[1푒] ∨푅1(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅121
푅1(1)[1푎] ∧푅1(2)[1푏] ∧푅1(1)[2푎] ∧푅1(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅1(3)[1푐] ∨푅1(4)[1푑] ∨푅1(5)[1푒] ∨푅1(1)[4푎] ∨푅1(1)[5푎]) =⇒ 푅171
푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[5푎] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[2푎] ∨푅2(1)[3푎] ∨푅2(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅42
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[3푎] ∧푅2(1)[4푎] ∧ (푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[2푎] ∨푅2(1)[5푎]) =⇒ 푅52
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(3)[1푐] ∧푅2(4)[1푑] ∧푅2(1)[3푎] ∧푅2(1)[4푎] ∧푅2(1)[5푎] ∧ (푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[2푎]) =⇒ 푅102
푅2(4)[1푑] ∧ (푅2(1)[1푎] ∨푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(5)[1푒] ∨푅2(1)[2푎] ∨푅2(1)[3푎] ∨푅2(1)[4푎] ∨푅2(1)[5푎]) =⇒ 푅152
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(5)[1푒] ∧푅2(1)[3푎] ∧ (푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(1)[2푎] ∨푅2(1)[4푎] ∨푅2(1)[5푎]) =⇒ 푅212
푅2(1)[1푎] ∧푅2(5)[1푒] ∧푅2(1)[3푎] ∧푅2(1)[5푎] ∧ (푅2(2)[1푏] ∨푅2(3)[1푐] ∨푅2(4)[1푑] ∨푅2(1)[2푎] ∨푅2(1)[4푎]) =⇒ 푅232
Table 8: Formulas used in step 5
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Summary
Throughout this work, we presented side channel cryptanalytic attacks against three sym-
metric key ciphers: (i) SOSEMANUK, which is a software-based stream cipher of the eS-
TREAM software portfolio, (ii) Hummingbird, which is a hybrid structure of block cipher
and stream ciphers dedicated for ultra-lightweight encryption and (iii) ZUC, which is a new
stream cipher proposed for the 4G mobile standard.
The overall complexity of our differential fault analysis attack against SOSEMANUK
can be summarized as follows: The average number of faults required to perform the attack
is 4×1536 = 6144. This fault injection phase requires the attacker to reinitialize the cipher
for 6144 times. The attack requires work equivalent to around 248 iterations. The storage
requirements amounts to 238.17 bytes.
Our attack against Hummingbird is inspired by the currently known attacks against
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AES. However, unlike AES, the key schedule properties of Hummingbird cannot be utilized
by the attacker to further reduce the complexity of the attack. This forces the attacker to
iterate the fault injection on every round of the 16-bit block cipher algorithm to recover the
whole key. Each 64-bit round key can be found, on average, using 12.51 faulty encryptions.
If we assume that the 256-bit secret key and 80-bit internal state have random distribution,
then the whole cipher can be broken after around 50 faults. To fully recover the key, we
have to guess 248 values of three 16-bit internal state registers which brings the whole
complexity of our attack to 푂(268).
Finally, we presented a scan based side channel attack against ZUC. Under reasonable
assumptions, our cryptanalysis allows the attacker to ascertain the whole location of the
internal registers of the LFSR and the memory cells. Consequently, this attack allows
the cryptanalyst to efficiently recover the cipher secret internal state in a relatively small
number of clock cycles.
6.2 Future work
When compared to other stream ciphers in the equivalent fault analysis model, DFA of
SOSEMANUK requires a relatively smaller number of faults. For example, the DFA attack
on RC4 given in [9] requires 216 faults in random locations of its inner state. Another DFA
attack on HC-128 [10] requires around 213 faults in random locations. In future work, it
will be interesting to see whether the number of faults for the DFA of SOSEMANUK and
other stream ciphers can be drastically decreased in the assumed fault model.
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A naive approach to prevent our attack is to use algorithm level redundancy and disable
the device output if the two produced key stream values do not match. Another more
efficient approach, which partially protects against fault attacks, is to add parity bits to
all the inner state resisters and disable the device output if any of these parity checks is
violated. Efficient fault analysis resistant implementations for SOSEMANUK, as well as for
other stream ciphers, need to be addressed in future research.
Another related research direction is the exploration of different side channel attacks
against the SHA-3 finalist [93] when operating in the MAC mode.
Developing cryptosystems that are inherently secure against side channel attacks, by
design, is also a very challenging research direction.
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